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Why were most transactions in the Russian industry in the 1990s carried out 
without the use of money? Theories explaining the phenomenon, when carefully 
assessed, seem to have missing gaps in the argument or inadequate evidence. The present 
paper critically reviews the theories, suggests neglected considerations, proposes an 
alternative explanation, and empirically tests the hypothesis. 
A large representative sample of Russian firms is used in the empirical part. 
TOBIT analysis shows that firms start to use non-monetary payments because of their 
liquidity problems. Further use of non-monetary payments is connected to kartoteka, a 
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Russian President calls Prime Minister: 
- Dear Prime Minister, I do not understand our 
economy. 
- Well then, let me explain it to you. 
- I can explain it myself. I can’t understand it! 
A Russian joke 
 
Introduction 
In 1999 I finished collecting data for a large survey of Russian enterprises. It was 
one of the largest surveys of the Russian manufacturing sector. 538 firms, located in 32 
regions of Russia were interviewed with more than 300 questions about different aspects 
of their work. I found it particularly interesting that interviewed firms were often on 
kartoteka – that is, the firm’s bank was under orders from the state to use all incoming 
deposits to pay taxes. The number of firms on kartoteka has increased to more than two-
thirds of all firms by 1998. During the second half of the 1990s, firms were placed on 
kartoteka at an amazing rate: a quarter of all off-kartoteka firms every year on average.  
I was also amazed at the number of non-monetary transactions happening in the 
Russian industry: more than a half of all transactions. Hypothesizing a possible link 
between the two phenomena, I have decided to explore what have caused the 
extraordinary volume of non-monetary transactions. 
I have studied the literature and have learned that there are several hypotheses 
explaining the growth of non-monetary transactions in Russia. The liquidity hypothesis 
seemed the most plausible, and I have taken it as a starting point. The liquidity hypothesis 
states that barter and other non-monetary forms of payment (offsets and promissory notes 
– veksels in Russian) appear when a firm suffers from a shortage of liquidity, that is, 
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when the firm lacks monetary means to pay its obligations. This explanation seems 
logical, but why do not firms simply borrow money? 
Marin and Schnitzer (1998) do not consider this question. Commander and 
Mumseen (1998), the authors of the liquidity hypothesis, have proposed that firms could 
not borrow money for a number of reasons, for instance because banks were lured by 
high interest rates offered by the state and thus diverted their resources to finance the 
state deficit. The virtual economy hypothesis does not have to answer this question, 
because its authors believe that firms do not lack liquidity. Firms rather lack 
“restructuring” according to Gaddy and Ickes (1998a and b). 
First of all, I felt that the liquidity hypothesis needed better empirical support 
because, for instance, Guriev and Ickes (1999) did not find any relationship between 
liquidity and barter. Therefore, my first empirical exercise was to check for this 
relationship using my data. I felt that much of the debate in the literature was due to the 
lack of appropriate data, and since I spent much effort collecting one of the best and most 
comprehensive samples of Russian firms of the late 90s, I believed that my data would 
help to resolve discrepancies in the results of conflicting hypotheses.1 
I have found a relationship between barter and the lack of liquidity. This result is 
not surprising: two of the studied hypotheses assume this relationship; managers, 
answering a question about motivation for barter, often name the lack of money as their 
prime incentive.  
Next, I have explored the question why firms are locked in non-monetary 
                                                
1 The data was collected under supervision of Prof. Earle from Stanford University whom I express much 
gratitude for the permission to use it for this research. 
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exchange, why such simple remedies as borrowing money did not work in Russia at that 
time. Although the Russian banking system was very undeveloped, and there were 
serious complications that made credit difficult to obtain (the moral hazard problem being 
the most obvious one), I felt that the link between the lack of liquidity – that seemed quite 
possible when Russian GDP declined by more than 40 percent during the 90s – and the 
widespread use of non-monetary exchange – more than half of all transactions – was due 
to some unstudied factor. I then turned my attention to kartoteka. 
Kartoteka is a tool of tax authorities to collect overdue taxes. About two weeks 
after taxes are not paid, a firm’s bank account is placed on what in Russian is called 
kartoteka. Kartoteka literally means a wooden box used in libraries. When someone 
borrows a book, a card (karta) is issued indicating who has borrowed that book and when 
the book has to be returned. A somewhat similar procedure is implemented when a firm 
does not pay taxes. The indebted firm is carded and an order to the bank is issued. The 
order directs the bank to transfer all incoming money to pay due taxes. Until due taxes 
are paid, the firm cannot use its money in the account.  
Interestingly, the tax authorities did not seize assets because the bankruptcy law 
had just been introduced at that time and required a much lengthier and complicated 
procedure, whereas the practice of kartoteka was a well-established institution and simply 
required following an instruction. 
If borrowing money is problematic, a firm on kartoteka has to pay and receive 
payments in non-monetary means. Indeed, I have found in my sample that being on 
kartoteka and the use of non-monetary payments are connected: kartoteka increases the 
use of barter (and all non-monetary means) by at least 10 percent. 
 4
Besides the strong link between kartoteka and the use of barter and all non-
monetary means, even when the liquidity effect is removed, I have also studied firms 
with different exposure to non-monetary payments in regard to their incentives for the 
use of non-monetary payments. I have followed Polterovich (1999) and Earle and 
Sabirianova (2000), who have introduced the notion of institutional traps or bad 
equilibria during transition. Institutional traps or equilibria arise when there are major 
shocks to the economic system and a transitory, temporary unusual practice becomes 
institutionalized and widespread despite the fact that under normal circumstances such 
phenomena are merely non-existent. 
In the case of Russia in the late 90s, such institutional trap was the use of non-
monetary trade. Exposure to non-monetary trade had a special effect on firms as I have 
found. It changed firms’ motivation regarding the use of non-monetary exchange: if the 
liquidity crisis was the prime motivation to employ barter and other non-monetary means 
for a firm accustomed to the monetary trade, the lack of liquidity did not have much 
impact on the firms that were actively trading in non-monetary means. Such firms were, 
in regard to their use of non-monetary exchange, primarily motivated by their kartoteka 
status. 
How does this study fit into discussion about non-monetary trade in Russia? First 
of all, I have shown that kartoteka has significantly contributed to the use of non-
monetary payments. The practice of kartoteka was mentioned in the previous research2 
                                                
2 Hendley, Ickes, and Ryterman (1998) write: “The State Tax Service estimates that 80 percent of firms 
have tax arrears. While this estimate is likely to be high, it does indicate that nearly all firms must confront 
the problem of blocked accounts, either their own or those of key trading partners, on a routine basis. In 
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but its effect was never quantified. This study not only quantifies this effect, which turned 
out to be very strong and significant – a tenth of variation in the use of non-monetary 
means – but it also shows that for firms using non-monetary trade on a regular basis 
kartoteka was the prime incentive for non-monetary trade. 
Second, I have shown that empirical tests confirm the liquidity hypothesis. A 
carefully constructed test shows a significant negative relationship between the level of 
liquidity and the use of barter. Therefore, the virtual economy hypothesis rejecting the 
link between liquidity and non-monetary payments cannot be accepted. 
Third, I have found that different forms of non-monetary payments behave 
differently with respect to liquidity and kartoteka. Barter responds strongly to these 
factors and drives the relationship for all non-monetary payments combined. A practice 
of cancellation of mutual debts without monetary payments (offsets) is associated with 
kartoteka but it has an indirect link to liquidity. Veksels turned out to be not responsive to 
kartoteka and liquidity but they were found to be related to the size thus suggesting that 
their nature is closer to conventional promissory notes. However, when all non-monetary 
forms were considered together, the effects of kartoteka and liquidity were the largest 
suggesting that these two factors are mostly important for the decision to avoid the 
monetary system as a whole. 
My further narration will unfold in the following fashion. First I will introduce 
and discuss the data that I have collected. Second, I will define relevant terms used in this 
research. In the third chapter I will describe the general environment of Russian economy 
in the 1990s. Fourth, I will review and evaluate existing explanations. In the fifth chapter, 
                                                                                                                                            
response, firms have developed the means to evade these restrictions.” 
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I will present results of my empirical analysis. In conclusion I will describe the situation 
with non-monetary transactions after the default of 1998, and will summarize my 
findings. 
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Chapter 1. Data 
 
Introduction 
One of the main obstacles to research of transition economies in general and 
Russia in particular, is data. It is hard to collect and even harder to insure acceptable 
quality. In the case of Russia, there are several problems that make gathering quality data 
especially difficult. Russia is big, there is no complete list of all companies, firms 
experience rapid changes that are not remembered or recorded, companies are reluctant to 
share information, the Military-Industrial Complex maintain secrecy3, and modern 
economic concepts are new to interviewers and company management understanding. 
Finally, companies may deliberately falsify information, especially financial. 
Lack of high quality comprehensive data on Russian industry was the main 
motivation for the project “Inside the Transforming Firm.” To the best of my knowledge, 
there were no other extensive surveys of Russian industry since the 1994 World Bank 
survey4, which I had extensively worked with, and which gave some initial ideas for the 
design of the present survey. 
Questionnaire design is the key element of a survey: if a question is not included 
or not understood, the resulting lack of data means that the project has failed. The other 
                                                
3 Which is as big as 25% of all manufacturing companies, see Earle J. and I. Komarov (2001) Measuring 
Defense Conversion in Russian Industry, Defense and Peace Economics, Volume 12, Number 2. 
4 Results of this survey are reported, for example, in Commander, S., Q. Fan, and M. Schaffer (editors) 
(1996) Enterprise Restructuring and Economic Policy in Russia, EDI Development Studies, Washington, 
World Bank. 
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important element is the choice of the organization implementing the fieldwork. 
Fortunately, the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), which is well known for surveys of 
public opinion during presidential campaigns with ratings closest to the fact,5 agreed to 
do this part of work. 
Some researchers enjoy the privileged position of using existing data that already 
has been collected, entered and cleaned. This research is based on data which has been 
collected by the author who participated in every aspect of data collection. I have visited 
firms during pilot surveys. I have studied literature on laws and practices used by Russian 
firms. I have designed the questionnaire assuring that every question is well understood 
by the respondents and capture the concepts of interest. I have trained interviewers 
assuring their professional attitude, and I have cleaned the data so that most ambiguous 
cases are ruled out. It would be no exaggeration to say that I know the data. 
The only deficiency is that at the time of the project I was only at a preliminary 
stage of my research of non-monetary transactions. Now, after studying the literature and 
giving the topic much time and thought, I would add more questions. However, the 
questionnaire is very comprehensive since it was designed for a variety of purposes and 
participants6, and thus I have much extra information, usefulness of which was unknown 
to me at the onset of the project. 
Overall, the survey “Inside the Transforming Firm” is one of the most 
                                                
5 For 1996 Russian presidential campaign, the prediction error was a matter of few percentage points. 
6 Besides the many other participants of the project, I want to mention (in alphabetical order) Serhiy 
Biletsky, J. David Brown, John S. Earle, and Klara Z. Sabirianova who most actively worked on the 
survey. 
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comprehensive surveys of Russian industry. A team of trained interviewers visited 538 
firms in 32 regions of Russia receiving answers to more than 300 questions in more than 
70 percent of visits. 
 
Survey “Inside the Transforming Firm” 
This research makes claims pertaining to the whole of industry and, moreover, 
economy, so it is important to understand how the data was collected and how 
representative the sample is. This section addresses these issues and draws upon the 
report on the project.7 
The Russian survey “Inside the Transforming Firm” was a survey of both 
enterprises and their managers, covering a wide variety of issues relevant to firm 
restructuring and performance.8 The survey collected quantitative information on the 
employment, costs, and finances of firms. Much of this information is routinely collected 
by the firms themselves, for the purpose of internal accounting (or for tax purposes) or 
for reporting to the Russian State Statistical Committee (Goskomstat). The survey relied 
upon the standardized variables that firms were using both to ensure comparability across 
firms and because special calculations for survey responses would have been unreliable 
and an excessive burden on respondents. 
Many important aspects of the Russian situation, however, are not well captured 
                                                
7 See full report in Biletsky et al. (1999). 
8 This research has been undertaken with the support of the European Union’s Tacis-ACE Programme 
1995.  The project team is also indebted to the Russian European Centre for Economic Policy, in Moscow, 
for the use of office space. 
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by the standard accounting concepts. Thus, the quantitative information in the survey was 
supplemented by detailed qualitative interviews with managers, chief accountants, and 
personnel directors, in order to obtain estimates of the extent of several aspects of 
restructuring and of the factors bringing them about. Issues such as non-monetary 
payments, ownership structure, corporate governance, and personnel policies do not 
appear in official forms, yet our extensive pilot studies showed that there are common 
ways of understanding these concepts that are amenable to standardization across firms. 
The success of any survey project depends on the quality of the connection 
between the researcher and the respondent, so that the theoretical hypotheses of social 
science can be reflected and therefore tested using the data supplied by respondents. The 
links in the connecting chain consist of the questionnaire, the sample, the fieldwork, the 
data entry, the data cleaning, and the analysis. The final product is no stronger than the 
weakest link in the chain, so much effort was put into each link. 
 
The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire9 used in the survey “Inside the Transforming Firm” was 
painstakingly developed for several years, with particular intensity during 1996-98. 
Questions were specified to test several hypotheses about the magnitude and the 
determinants of important dimensions of enterprise restructuring as well as to collect 
information on issues raised in the literature on transition. Several pilot studies were 
conducted as well as case studies, to determine the viability of each question. Much effort 
was devoted to ensuring that the quantitative concepts reflected current accounting 
                                                
9 See the English version of the questionnaire in Appendix D. 
 11
practices (which was particularly complicated by the fact that these practices changed 
several times during the 1990s) and that the qualitative questions made sense to the 
respondents. Each section of the questionnaire was designed to be answered by a specific 
respondent in the firm, the manager with the most knowledge about the particular topic. 
The questionnaire was revised drastically several times to improve its quality and 
reliability, so that the final result is in fact one of the most valuable products of this 
research. 
As to the topic of this research, most surveys ask about barter only or classify 
non-monetary transactions as barter and offsets. Our questionnaire offered a complete list 
of possible transaction options: barter, offsets, veksels, cash, monetary transfers, and 
other. The list was applied not only to the distribution of sales but also to the acquisition 
of inputs, dimension, which has not been much studied before but is important if you ask 
a question why in-kind payments are offered. 
 
The Sample 
Most studies of Russian enterprises employ samples that are small, non-randomly 
selected, and restricted to just a few regions of the country. The purpose of this research, 
however, was to enable inferences to be drawn about Russia as a whole, which requires a 
sufficiently large sample size, probability sampling, and a stratified design to include a 
diverse set of regions. Regional diversity is particularly crucial in the Russian context, 
given the large differences in local factor and product markets, in legal environments and 
infrastructure, and in industrial composition across the regions – Moscow versus the rest 
of Russia being the most notorious example. 
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No randomly drawn or regionally stratified sample existed before the beginning 
of this project. Moreover, there was no complete list of firms from which such a sample 
might be drawn.10 Reconciling the need to construct such a sample with the cost and time 
constraints of the project was one of the most difficult tasks. 
The solution to this dilemma was to piggyback on the careful procedures, 
including sophisticated regional stratification, of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey. The used sample of firms covers 32 regions of the Russian Federation11, and 
involves a random selection of employers with a probability proportional to firm 
employment. In this respect, it is a sample uniquely capable of permitting inferences to be 
drawn about Russia as a whole. The motivation for the sampling procedure is more fully 
described in a sub-section below, together with some analysis of the representativeness of 
the resulting sample. 
 
The Fieldwork 
The logistical and personnel requirements of a national survey in Russia dwarf 
those of other countries. The enterprises in our sample are scattered across all major 
regions, many of them in quite remote areas. Moreover, the interviewers live in the 
                                                
10 In the early stages of the project, the plan was to re-interview the sample of companies studied in a 
World Bank survey of July 1994, but it proved impossible to identify these companies. In any case, the 
finally employed sampling procedure is arguably a significant improvement. 
11 Subjects of the Russian Federation are autonomous republics, autonomous territories (okrugs), provinces 
(oblasts), and territories (krais). These subjects are further grouped into 12 bigger regions that were used to 
construct regional dummies in this research. 
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regions and are therefore similarly scattered. 
The project laid great stress on interviewer training, and supervisors and 
interviewers from all regions except St. Petersburg City and Leningradskaya Oblast (the 
supervisors trained interviewers in these locales) were brought to Moscow for intensive 
training sessions conducted by the author and Serhiy Biletsky. We also traveled to 
Kaluzhskaya Oblast, Krasnoyarsky Krai, Lipetskaya Oblast, Penzenskaya Oblast, 
Saratovskaya Oblast, Smolensk, Tambovskaya Oblast, Tula, and Voronezh to train the 
interviewers in these locations. The training sessions included a thorough explanation of 
the questionnaire and role-playing on the problems likely to be encountered during the 
fieldwork. 
Fieldwork was carried out by the Public Opinion Foundation, with supervision 
and monitoring from the project team12, including associates in several locations 
(particularly Chelyabinsk and Rostov).  
 
The Data Entry and Cleaning 
All completed questionnaires were first scrutinized by the project team as well as 
the Public Opinion Foundation coordinators. Inconsistencies were identified, and 
questionnaires returned for re-interviewing. When ready for entry, questionnaires were 
double entered and checked for consistency. A checking program was then applied to 
search for further inconsistencies in the data, again leading to a further cycle of re-
interviewing. 
 
                                                
12 The author and Sergiy Biletsky most actively worked with the Public Opinion Foundation. 
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Sampling Procedures 
The task of designing the sample for this study was particularly daunting. Russia 
is not only huge and heterogeneous, implying that any research purporting to draw 
conclusions about the country as a whole would have to cover 2 continents and 11 time 
zones and require very careful regional selection. But it also has no complete lists of 
enterprises from which a probability sample could be drawn. With great effort, we13 
managed to obtain the Goskomstat Industrial Enterprise Registries, but this list omitted 
most small firms (with fewer than 100 employees) and even some larger ones. Given the 
large number of split-ups, spin-offs and other reorganizations that seemed to be taking 
place in Russian industry, we did not want to completely omit the smaller firms. At the 
same time, it is clear that the larger firms are more important in Russian manufacturing, 
so we did not want to sample small and large enterprises with equal probability. 
Our solution to the problem of regional and intra-regional sample selection was to 
share the accomplishments of the sampling strategy of a household survey, the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). The RLMS employs a multistage probability 
sample, starting from a list of 2029 rayons, allocated into 38 strata, of which Moscow 
City, Moscow Oblast, and St. Petersburg City were included with certainty (self-
representing strata), while 35 other rayons were selected as primary sampling units 
(PSUs), one each from the other 35 strata, with a probability proportional to size. 
Secondary sampling units were selected within each PSU in proportion to the urban and 
rural population sizes. Within these areas, dwellings were enumerated and then drawn 
                                                
13 Credit for this part is mostly owed to Sergiy Biletsky and David Brown. 
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randomly from a list.14 
One of the little-known aspects of the RLMS is that workers are asked several 
open-ended questions about the nature of their jobs and employers. In examining the 
string variables containing those answers, we found that nearly every worker, particularly 
those employed in manufacturing firms, at one time or another reported the exact name of 
his or her employer. Our original sample consisted of the complete list of these 
employers, 538 firms. Thus, if the RLMS sample of households is a national probability 
sample, then our enterprise sample is a national probability sample of manufacturing 
firms in Russia, drawn with a probability proportional to employment. 
Of course, over the course of data collection we learned that many companies 
went bankrupt, “stopped operations” – that is we would find a lonely guard who would 
tell us that no one works here any more, some firms could not be found, some have 
changed their names, some have merged or spun off. Some firms refused to participate. 
But 381 firm participated in the survey – response rate of over 70 percent – thus 
providing us with one of the best data sets on the Russian industry. 
Before empirically checking representativeness relative to the whole of Russia in 
the next section, let us examine what the sampling procedure implies for 
representativeness. Obviously, if we had had information about employers for the whole 
population of Russia, we could have had the complete list of all employers. But the 
RLMS samples only a fraction of the whole population. Thus if the sampled employers 
                                                
14 For more information about the RLMS sampling procedures, see M.S. Swafford and M.S. Kosolapov, 
“Technical Report: Sample of the Russian Federation, Rounds 5 to 8, Russian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey,” March 1999. 
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are not systematically different from the whole population along dimensions of interest, 
the sample can be said to be unbiased. 
The designers of the RLMS claim that regions as well as urban and rural segments 
of the population of Russia are well represented in the RLMS sample. The first claim – 
regional representativeness of population – should insure regional representativeness of 
the employers' sample. Indeed, regional dimension of the sample, as we will see below, 
follows Goskomstat figures most closely. Although emphasis on the adequate 
representation of the rural population could bias representation of manufacturing firms, 
which obviously tend to be located in urban areas, we believe that the focus on the rural 
segment of population favorably distinguishes our sample from other surveys which 
never made any attempt to research firms in such remote rural arrears. We presume that a 
firm located in an urban area is different from the same kind of firm in a rural area. 
Although the used sampling procedure cannot assure that our sample is 
representative, especially along multiple dimensions, the original sample, which we 
employed in the survey, covers over 6 percent of the manufacturing employment. Most 




Now we turn to a description of the characteristics of the original sample by 
industry and region. Although our sampling procedure ensures a non-biased probability 
of entering the sample, conditional on the procedures of regional stratification, it does not 
guarantee (nor could it) representativeness along every dimension. The aim here is to 
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assess the representativeness of the sample relative to the population estimates available 
from official sources, namely the Goskomstat 1998 Statistical Yearbook15 and the 
Goskomstat 1998 Regional Yearbook which, it should be borne in mind, may also suffer 
from problems of reliability.16 Figure 1 shows the distribution of firms (as a percentage) 
by industry in the sample and the Goskomstat “population,” respectively. 
The sample appears to be weighted towards firms in the power (electroenergy), 
fuel, and ferrous metallurgy, at the same time under-represented in wood and medicine 
sectors relative to the Goskomstat figures. It is notable that the sample and population 
proportions for machine building are almost exactly equal, at about 40 percent each. 
Another view of representativeness is shown in Figure 2, which contains percent of 
sample firms in population (as reported by Goskomstat) in each industry. 
By both number of firms and industrial employment, electroenergy, fuel, and 
ferrous metallurgy sectors appear to be over-represented, while sectors such as wood and 
medicine (pharmaceuticals) are under-represented, relative to the Goskomstat reports. It 
should be remembered that our sampling procedure provided a weight on the probability 
of entry in proportion to the employment size of the firm, however; thus we also consider 
the distribution of employment implied by the sample, compared to that reported by 
Goskomstat. Figure 3 shows this. 
The figure again shows that the sample is somewhat biased towards heavy industry. 
                                                
15 Every year Goskomstat compiles an annual report on the Russian economy. The industry section of this 
report is based on data submitted by firms. 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The weight by employment increases representativeness of the sample as 
compared to the weight by the number of firms. This fact implies that very small firms, as 
measured by employment, were excluded from the sample because of their low 
probability of entering it. 
Perhaps because the RLMS sampling procedure contained an explicit 
stratification by region, the sample and population proportions are more closely aligned 
along this dimension. The distribution of the number of firms by region is shown in 
Figure 4. The Central region is slightly under-represented in the sample, relative to the 
Goskomstat figures, while the Urals and Central-Chernozyom are slightly over-
represented. 
Another view of the distribution appears in Figure 5, showing the ratio in 
percentage terms of the number of firms and employment in the sample to the number 
reported by Goskomstat, by region. Consistent with the goals of the project, all regions 
are well represented, on average at about 6 percent of the population employment. 
The distribution of employment across regions shows somewhat more variation in 
Figure 6. In particular, North and Siberia (both East and West) are under-represented, but 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To summarize, the sample closely follows regional dimension when compared to 
Goskomstat numbers. As to the industrial distribution, the sample is somewhat biased 
towards heavy industry. However, one should keep in mind that Goskomstat numbers 
may be not the best benchmark (but the only available) since Goskomstat registries omit 
most of small firms. In any case, the sample covers 6 percent of the manufacturing 
employment that seems a relatively high representation of the manufacturing industry at 
least when compared to any other available survey data. 
 
Summary 
Data used in this paper can be said to be the best available. Besides, having 
participated in every aspect of obtaining this data, I am in a position to know its 
peculiarities. Such knowledge is usually unavailable to economists who work with data 
collected by other researchers. For instance, having designed some of the questions and 
having worked with Russian statistical concepts and all of the data which I managed to 
obtain (such as Goskomstat registries and GNOZIS database), I propose an arguably 
better measure of liquidity than that of Guriev and Ickes (1999). This measure is 
introduced in Chapter 4 of the present study, where the use of this measure radically 
changes the meaning of the liquidity hypothesis. 
I have personally visited some firms and interviewed their management. 
Sometimes it was clear that despite years spent on designing the questionnaire, it still 
sometimes fails to capture the complex life of the present-day enterprises in Russia. 
Incompetence, inaccuracy, lack of records obscure getting reliable answers. Thus the 
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choice of the respondent, design of the questions, and training of interviewers proved to 
be the key to the success of the survey and this work in general since it relies heavily on 
empirics. My efforts spent on these key elements make me believe that the data offers 










Chapter 2. Definitions 
 
Introduction 
Russian reforms aimed at establishing a market economy in the place of a planned 
economy were accompanied by a few phenomena that puzzled economists. One of such 
phenomena is the use of non-monetary transactions in Russia in 1994-1998. By 1998, 
firms mostly used non-monetary (barter, offsets, veksels) payments instead of the 
monetary (bank transfers, cash) (see Figure 7). 
What is a non-monetary transaction? In the Russian context, exchange of goods 
for goods (barter), goods for promissory notes (veksels), a swap of debts or exchange of 
goods for debt (offsets) are all examples of non-monetary transactions. Non-monetary 
transactions always involve a payment made in means other than money. 
 
Figure 7. Decomposition of Payments, 1994 and 1998 




















Source: Author’s calculations based on the “Inside the Transforming Firm” survey of summer 1999. 
 
Barter 
Barter is conventionally defined as a reciprocal exchange of goods without the use 
of money. It is important to distinguish when the goods received as a payment are used 
inside the firm from when the goods are re-sold for money, re-bartered, or exchanged for 
other non-monetary means of payment. In the latter use, goods play a role of the medium 
of exchange. In the former, goods satisfy wants of the firm. Aukucionek (1997) proposes 
that the barter goods in Russia are mostly used inside the firm. 
It is also worth understanding the sides of barter exchange. Industrial firms can 
barter with each other, the government or other sectors of economy. Commander and 
Mumssen (1998) report the following partners in non-monetary transactions, listed in the 
ascending order of responses to the question about percent of different parties as a 
















1. utilities providers,  
2. budget organizations,  
3. processing industry,  
4. transportation companies,  
5. extracting industry,  
6. wholesale trade.  
Thus most barter transactions of industry happen between the industry and quasi-
budget organizations but not within the industry itself. 
When barter had just started to grow in Russia, a common barter transaction 
would also have some cash co-payment accompanying the payment in goods. As time 
passed, however, the share of pure barter (that is exchange of goods only) had grown. 
According to Aukucionek (1997), barter transactions without the use of money accounted 
for 64 percent of all industrial barter transactions in 1997. 
Barter in Russia had been rising to levels previously unknown in many other 
economies. Aukucionek (1997) provides the following estimates: in 1992 industrial firms 
bartered 6 percent of their output; in the first half of 1997 this share was 41 percent. My 
estimates are lower but still exceptionally high: in 1998, 25 percent of output was 
bartered, a rise from 18 percent in 1994 (see Figure 7).17 Only two other transitional 
countries had higher shares of barter: Croatia (32.8 percent of GDP in 1999) and 
                                                
17 Marin et al. (2000) cites the World Business Environment Survey, World Bank-EBRD 1999, and supplies 
the following estimates for barter in Russia: 1999 = 24.1 percent of GDP, 1996 = 23.5. Note that their and 
my estimates include all firms whereas some, e.g., Commander and Mumssen’s (1998), include only firms 
with a positive barter share. 
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Moldova (26.3 percent).18 All other countries in transition experienced only a temporarily 
rise of barter. Estimates for Western economies are scarce but, according to Prendergast 
and Stole (1999), firms in developed market economies also use barter, especially in 
international trade where counter-trade is estimated at a minimum of 10 percent of the 
total trade volume. 
 
Offsets 
Offsets – (vzaiimo) zachyoty in Russian – usually refer to the mutual cancellation 
of debts, often involving more than two firms. Say Firm A supplies Firm B, Firm B 
supplies Firm C, Firm C, in turn, supplies Firm A. No firm pays money but writes off 
each other’s debt. Thus Firm C writes off debt of Firm A, Firm B writes off debt of Firm 
C, and Firm A writes off debt of Firm B. Firms could also purchase each other’s debt in 
the market. 
There were nation-wide cancellations of debts in 1993 and later initiated by the 
government. The government on local (provincial and city) and federal levels cancelled 
its obligations against tax arrears, and thus offsets are known to be associated with 
settling accounts with the government. 
However, firms also use offsets in settling accounts with each other, a good 
illustration of which can be found in Latynina (2000)19: “Let’s take three enterprises. 
                                                
18 As cited in Marin et al. (2000) from the World Business Environment Survey, World Bank-EBRD 1999. 
19 Yuliya Latynina is a well-known Russian economic journalist working in Moscow Times daily and for 
TVS TV station now. She is the author of a series of popular books describing reality of doing business in 
Russia. These books are sometimes the best source of information about “unusual” economic practices, 
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Severstal makes steel for Sevmash. Sevmash uses this steel to make an oil-and-gas-
extracting platform for Gazprom. In a monetary economy, Gazprom pays for the 
platform, Sevmash – for the steel, and Severstal pays Gazprom for the gas. In the Russian 
economy, Gazprom does not pay Sevmash for the platform, Sevmash does not pay 
Severstal for steel, and Severstal does not pay for gas. But in order to cancel its debts to 
Gazprom, Severstal delivers steel to Sevmash, and Sevmash makes the platform to cancel 
its arrears to Severstal.” 
Offsets of debt among firms can be viewed as a further development of the non-
monetary system of exchange.20 A firm has an option to pay not only with money but 
also with its own or someone else's goods or debt. According to anecdotal evidence, there 
seems to be a rather developed market of inter-firm debt.21 
Based on my data, the use of offsets in Russia grew from about 13 percent in 
1994 to 26 percent in 1998 (see Figure 7). 
                                                                                                                                            
such as her “Okhota Na Izyubria” (1999) which made some things about barter clearer to me. 
20 While working on this dissertation, the author shared a house with a close friend. Both of us were short 
of cash from time to time and thus received temporarily loans from each other. We also shared each other’s 
goods. In settling our accounts, we rarely used cash or monetary transactions like giving a check. Most of 
our debt was cancelled against goods, such as food, or services, such as international telephone calls. We, 
in effect, operated in a non-monetary economy. Presumably, this kind of behavior presupposes close 
friendship, i.e. trust, and ensured, by immobility, close proximity to each other, thus lower enforcement 
costs. Note the role of the double coincidence of wants since we had a large overlap of products we both 
used. Note also that we would ask a stranger for money in similar circumstances because non-monetary 
exchange opens up a room for cheating and subjective pricing. 




Promissory notes – veksels in Russian –are commercial papers which state how 
much money will be repaid on a certain date in the future. The main difference – a 
Russian peculiarity22 – between a conventional promissory note and a veksel is that the 
latter, if issued by companies, is often redeemed in goods while the former is repaid only 
in money. Russian electricity-generating companies,23 sometimes referred to as AO 
Energos, use veksels most extensively, “paying” their suppliers with promises of 
electricity delivery against submission of a veksel. Thus AO Energos basically get a free 
credit from their suppliers as suggested in Marin and Schnitzer (1998). Suppliers can 
trade such veksels in a secondary market if they cannot use them directly, although they 
cannot assure 100 percent of their face value and sell these papers with a substantial 
discount.24 The discount is positively associated with a number of limitations on the 
veksel buy-back. For instance, repayment dates are usually far in the future, 10-20 years 
from the time when the veksel was issued. AO Energos use such limitations to effectively 
price discriminate debtors on their ability to pay in cash.  
Banks are also famous for using veksels as a form of credit from their clients. 
                                                
22 As noted by Schaffer (1999). 
23 See empirical evidence in Commander and Mumssen (1998). 
24 This situation can be modeled by a bilateral monopoly bargaining model where the value of good is 
different between trading parties. See, for example, Chatterjee K. and L. Samuelson (1983) Bargaining 
under Incomplete Information, Operations Research, No. 31, pp. 835-851. Their model may help 
explaining huge discounts observed in the veksels market. 
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Veksels in this case are usually 100 percent liquid bank obligations, e.g., Sberbank 
veksels, which play a role of quasi-money. Since such veksels are easily redeemed in 
money, they are much like other monetary instruments used by banks around the world, 
such as credit cards or (traveler’s) checks. Such private money, which can be 
instantaneously turned into cash, emerges when it can perform functions that the 
government paper money cannot. For instance, there are legal restrictions on the amount 
of cash used in daily transactions that the bank veksels do not have. If compared from the 
liquidity standpoint of firms, the bank veksels and the government money are very close 
payment options and, when compared along this dimension, differ quite substantially 
from other payment instruments such as goods, debts, or commodity veksels that are all 
supposedly less liquid. 
To summarize, a veksel is a commercial paper used as a payment that promises a 
delivery of either goods or money in the future. While there is some similarity between 
veksels and arrears – both are promises to pay in the future – there is an important 
distinction between them. Veksel is an agreed form of deferred payment whereas arrears 
or non-payments are not. Thus, arrears are a violation of the contract, while veksels are 
the contract. 
In my sample, veksels were used as a means of payment in 5 percent of all sales in 
1998, a rise from 3 percent in 1994 (see Figure 7). 
 
Summary 
The period from 1994 to 1998 is characterized by an increased use of non-
monetary payments. By 1998 firms paid and received payments mostly in non-monetary 
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forms. 
There are three basic forms of non-monetary instruments: barter, offsets, and 
veksels. Barter is exchange of goods without use of money. An offset is a mutual 
cancellation of debt. A veksel is a promissory note which can be repaid either in kind or 
in money. In 1998, barter and offsets comprised majority of non-monetary payments in 
roughly equal shares of 25 percent of all payment options, whereas veksels were used in 
about 5 percent of transactions. 
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Chapter 3. Russia’s Economic Background 
 
Introduction  
Makarov and Kleiner (1999) claim that barter has been a feature of the Russian 
economy long before transition. In the Soviet Union, the sale of certain commodities was 
prohibited (monetary exchange was allowed only in the consumer goods market), so that 
the only permissible form of trade of extra-plan production among enterprises was barter. 
Makarov and Kleiner estimate the use of barter in the Soviet economy at about 5 percent 
of GDP. For markets such as real estate, barter was very common since bartering of 
housing was the only legal form of exchange, so all exchange of apartments in the Soviet 
Union was done through barter, often involving multi-party inter-regional chains that the 
author has experienced first-hand. 
As statistics of the previous chapter suggest, the use of non-monetary payments 
has soared during the years of reform, particularly during 1994-1998. From the 
hypothesized 5 percent during the Soviet times, the use of non-monetary payments has 
risen to over 50 percent during transition.  
Therefore, it seems clear that the rise of non-monetary exchange is connected to 
the transition and the economic environment of Russia during the period of major 
reforms. This chapter will describe Russia’s economic environment in 1994-1998 and 
earlier, and will review major changes introduced to the economic organization of society 
during this period. 
Possibly the most surprising part of the economic environment was the use of 
non-monetary payments. I will provide statistics on the use of non-monetary transactions 
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across industries, regions, and ownership categories that will provide us with some 
preliminary understanding of this phenomenon. 
 
Russian Economy in Transition 
Enterprises in Russia have experienced many shocks, both external and internal. 
The first external shock was liberalization of prices in January 1992 when setting prices 
became a decision of enterprise management. Deregulation of prices in the Russian 
economy has become widespread since 1990. For 1990, 62 percent of enterprises in my 
sample25 reported that all their prices were controlled, whereas in 1998 the percent of 
such firms had decreased to 16 percent. The percent of firms with no price control grew 
from 25 to 65 percent over the period of 1990-1998. Liberalization of prices was the first 
important element in the sequence of reforms that has followed.  
Liberalization of prices set off an initial price jump that later was followed by 
accelerating inflation fueled by the money-printing press. A World Development 
Indicators (WDI) report shows inflation of over 300 percent in 1994. Inflation had been 
moderated by 1997 (15 percent as reported in WDI), when the ruble was denominated by 
1,000. During this period, payments in money had an obvious disadvantage as compared 
to payments in goods if the monetary payment was not adjusted for inflation. 
The Soviet central distribution system started to disappear in the beginning of 90-
ies so that enterprises had to insure supplies and deliver output according to signed 
contracts. This change set off some disorganization of activity that was further fueled by 
the collapse of the CMEA trade and trade within the former Soviet Union. Contracting 
                                                
25 Any number given without source citation is calculated from the sample of firms described in Chapter 2. 
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difficulties are central to the explanation of barter by Marin and Schnitzer (1998), which 
will be reviewed in the next chapter. 
Moreover, according to Ivanenko (2002), the Central Bank credit policy has been 
dramatically changed. In the past, the supplier’s account was automatically credited by 
the Central Bank when the delivery documents signed by the customer were presented at 
a bank. Now, firms had to insure that their customers pay for the delivery and no 
automatic credit was given. Thus firms had to sell their output to the final users first in 
order to have funds to pay their suppliers, who, in turn, would then have funds to pay 
further downstream. Without working capital, which was presumably eroded by high 
inflation, that was a big change in the payment system. 
Not only the economic environment but also the internal organization of firms 
was changing. The laws permitting lease-buyouts and worker ownership had already been 
introduced in the Soviet Union. Later, mostly in 1994, majority of enterprises were 
privatized under the Mass Privatization Program. Most privileges in the Program were 
given to workers, so investors stayed away from the process. In 1994, according to my 
sample, 51 percent of firms became predominantly insider owned, 27 percent remained 
state owned, and 15 percent became owned by outsiders. 
Since 1994 the ownership structure has been changing in favor of outside owners. 
The average insider and state shares had fallen to 36 and 22 percent respectively, the 
outsider share had grown to 37 percent by 1998. However, as statistics on non-monetary 
transactions will demonstrate later in the section, the growing private share did not 
provide enough incentives for the use of monetary payments. 
The banking system has proven to be fragile and undeveloped. Firms witnessed 
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two major financial crises: in August of 1995, and in August of 1998, and at least two 
large exchange rate devaluations (October of 1994 and August of 1998). The Russian 
financial crisis in August of 1998 lead to bankruptcy of many banks and was echoed in 
other parts of the world. 
The crisis was prompted by the borrowings of the government to finance its fiscal 
deficit through the sale treasury bills (GKOs), the real yield on which had been 
exceptionally high, well over 10 percent, and often going over 50 percent. Banks used 
this opportunity to re-direct their resources from the industry to the government, which 
received over 45 percent of total lending by commercial banks in mid-1998 as 
documented in Commander and Mummsen (1998). 
Thus credit to the private sector was quite low, under 10 percent of GDP26 on 
average during this period. For comparison, OECD countries, on average, had around 80 
percent in 1995. The Russian Federation ranked 101 in the 1996 World Development 
Indicators study of ratios of credit to GDP, with Japan leading the ranking with 207 
percent. All transitional countries had higher ratings except Armenia, Moldova, 
Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The lack of adequate supply of credit is the backbone of 
Commander and Mumssen’s (1998) hypothesis explaining the growth of non-monetary 
payments. Their argument will be reviewed in the next section. 
Over the same period, real incomes of workers and the aggregate demand were 
falling. For the period from 1990 to 1998, GDP had declined by more than 40 percent as 
reported in a WDI study. The authors of the virtual economy hypothesis (Gaddy and 
Ickes (1998a)) believe that much of the manufacturing sector of Russia is value-
                                                
26 In my sample, the credit to sales ratio in 1998 was .24. 
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destroying under market conditions, and that only the government-sanctioned use of 
barter helps them to be afloat. This argument will also be reviewed in the next section. 
With financial position of Russian firms worsening, firm arrears had become 
widespread. According to my sample, 58 percent of firms in 1994 and 72 percent in 1998 
had overdue payables or receivables. The ratio of receivables as well as payables to sales 
had doubled from 1994 to 1998. The percent of overdue payables was two times higher 
than the percent of overdue receivables in 1994 and 1998, meaning that Russian firms 
were on average net debtors, and, as further investigation shows, they are mostly indebted 
to the government. 
From 1994 to 1998 tax arrears had grown twofold and comprised 34 percent of all 
arrears (the largest category was arrears to other firms – 41 percent). 90 percent of firms 
in my sample had overdue tax payments in 1998. 
The government, as a measure to increase tax collection, introduced kartoteka. If 
taxes are not paid within 17 days of the due date, tax authorities block firm’s account (the 
account is placed on kartoteka, hence the name), so that all money that comes into the 
account gets re-routed to the government to pay firm's overdue tax obligations. The 
collection procedure is more cumbersome in the case of other creditors since it requires a 
court decision whereas tax authorities enjoy a privileged position of having a direct 
access to firm’s account without a court decision. 
With a large number of enterprises having overdue taxes, such a radical tax 
collection measure creates a strong incentive to avoid the use of the formal banking 
system. Indeed, as empirical evidence of Chapter 5 will demonstrate, kartoteka is the 
main factor that perpetuated the use of non-monetary payments, and barter in particular. 
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Despite financial losses of firms in 1994-199627, less than 1 percent of firms in 
the sample had bankruptcy procedures initiated against them over this period. In 1996-
1999 this percentage had somewhat increased, to 3-6 percent. Bankruptcy procedures in 
Russia, according to the law, are a 3- or 4-stage process, each stage lasting about a year. 
Obviously, bankruptcy had not yet been an effective debt collection mechanism against 
non-viable firms. 
 
Non-Monetary Payments in Russia in 1994-1998 
The most surprising element of the economic environment of 1994-1998 was the 
dramatic use of in-kind payments. Moreover, as Figure 8 demonstrates, the use of non-
monetary payments had been increasing from 1994 to 1998. 
 
Figure 8. Change in Intensity of Non-Monetary Transactions, 1994 and 1998 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the “Inside the Transforming Firm” survey of summer 1999. 
 
The category of firms which collected only monetary payments for their sales and 
paid only in money for inputs had shrunk by approximately a half by 1998. At the same 
time, the category of firms which used only non-monetary payments had grown by more 
than two times. Other categories of firms had also demonstrated extraordinary growth in 
the use of non-monetary payments. 
All branches of industry had actively used non-monetary payments (see Table 1). 
Electricity, fuel, wood, and construction materials branches of industry lead the 
distribution with an average unadjusted share of non-monetary payments of about 40-50 
percent in 1994 and about 70-80 percent in 1998. The lowest shares were in food, light, 
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Table 1. Industry Distribution of Non-Monetary Payments (NMP), 1994 and 1998 
 Non-  Monetary  Payments  in:  
Regions Inputs 98  Inputs 94  Output 98  Output 94  
 Mean Freq. Mean Freq. Mean Freq. Mean Freq.
Electricity .814 29 .659 25 .783 30 .572 24
Fuel .769 8 .375 4 .703 8 .400 4
Wood .761 7 .517 6 .834 7 .502 6
Construction 
Materials .721 25 .432 23 .756 25 .389 25
Machine-
Building .544 138 .396 126 .548 138 .400 131
Ferrous 
Metallurgy .520 11 .283 10 .538 11 .290 11
Chemical .515 17 .333 16 .575 17 .314 17
Medicine .500 2 .500 2 .525 2 .425 2
Other .476 5 .120 5 .616 5 .120 5
Light .445 39 .270 35 .498 40 .290 36
Food .344 63 .196 58 .349 63 .222 59
Non-Ferrous 
Metallurgy .320 5 .124 5 .538 5 .076 5
Printing .246 7 .143 7 .283 7 .057 7
Other 
Manufacturing .033 3 .050 3 .067 3 .083 3
Total .525 359 .348 325 .543 361 .343 335
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the “Inside the Transforming Firm” survey of summer 1999. 
 
All regions got involved in non-monetary exchange as shown in Table 2. The 
lowest shares of non-monetary payments are observed in North-West (mostly St. 
Petersburg) and Central (mostly Moscow) regions, 22 and 31 percent in 1994, and under 




Table 2. Regional Distribution of Non-Monetary Payments, 1994 and 1998 










 Mean Freq. Mean Freq. Mean Freq. Mean Freq
East Siberia .752 15 .400 14 .768 15 .429 15
Ural .681 60 .419 53 .698 59 .401 54
Volga-Vyatka .673 20 .400 20 .665 21 .366 20
West Siberia .626 29 .392 28 .680 29 .362 28
Povolzhie .622 31 .432 24 .616 32 .401 26
North Caucasus .575 48 .310 46 .565 48 .299 47
North .561 11 .454 7 .557 11 .379 7
Far East .446 12 .281 10 .358 12 .302 10
Central-
Chernozyom .404 23 .313 23 .512 23 .422 23
Central .373 78 .310 72 .387 79 .283 76
North-West .271 33 .219 29 .335 33 .270 30
Total .526 360 .347 326 .544 362 .342 336
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the “Inside the Transforming Firm” survey of summer 1999. 
 
An important question is whether the use of non-monetary payments is 
determined by ownership. Table 3 presents the distribution of non-monetary sales by un-
weighted ownership categories. The framework for constructing ownership categories 
relies upon classification in Earle, Estrin, and Leshchenko (1996). First, I sort all 
ownership types into three big groups: the state, the outsiders and the insiders. The 
dominant category is the one greater than 30 percent, and the sum of percents in other 
ownership categories. For example, “managers” is the dominant category if the 
managers’ share is greater than 30 percent and the sum of the outsiders and the state 
shares. Everything else that does not fit into this definition is classified as indeterminate.
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Table 3. Dominant Ownership and Non-Monetary Payments, 1994 and 1998 
 Non- Monetary Payments in: 
Dominant Output 98 Inputs 98 
Ownership 1998 Mean Freq. Mean Freq. 
Other firms .577 63 .552 61 
Federal gvt .579 42 .581 44 
Local gvt .551 26 .533 26 
Workers .496 86 .452 86 
Indeterminate .563 81 .556 80 
Managers .581 17 .560 17 
Persons .557 34 .547 34 
Foreigners .387 13 .401 12 
Avg/Total .544 362 .526 360 
Dominant  Output 94  Inputs 94 
Ownership 1994 Mean Freq. Mean Freq. 
Other firms .440 24 .530 22 
Managers .430 6 .316 5 
Federal gvt .419 58 .427 53 
Persons .337 7 .264 7 
Indeterminate .334 103 .319 103 
Workers .309 110 .321 107 
Local gvt .256 25 .304 26 
Foreigners .130 3 .150 3 
Avg/Total .342 336 .347 326 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the “Inside the Transforming Firm” survey of summer 1999. 
Dominant Ownership: All ownership types are sorted into three big groups: the state, the outsiders and the 
insiders. The dominant ownership category is the one, which is greater than 30 percent and the sum of 
percents in other ownership categories. 
 
By 1998 firms under any ownership used non-monetary payments. Not 
surprisingly, foreigners did not use non-monetary payments extensively, although more 
than 38 percent of their sales were paid in non-monetary form. For comparison with other 
works, Commander and Mumssen (1998) have found that the state firms avoid barter but 
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Guriev and Ickes (1999) have found no statistically significant differences among 
ownership types. 
I have also investigated the use of non-monetary payments by de novo firms 
(Table 4). I define de novo firms according to two definitions: de novo 1 – firms that were 
established after 1986, and de novo 2 – firms that had a major reorganization after 1986 
(were spun off or merged). 
 
Table 4. Use of Non-Monetary Payments by De Novo Firms 
Firms Year Mean Share of 
 Non-Monetary 
Payments 
 in Sales 
No. of 
cases 
De novo 1 1994 .16 8 
  1998 .41 11 
De novo 2 1994 .37 108 
  1998 .59 120 
All 1994 .34 336 
  1998 .54 362 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the “Inside the Transforming Firm” survey of summer 1999. 
Definitions: De novo 1: firms founded after 1986. De novo 2: firms re-organized after 1986. All: all firms 
in the sample which reported a non-missing value for non-monetary payments. 
 
It appears that de novo 2 firms are not much different from an average firm, but de novo 1 
firms seem to use less non-monetary payments that an average firm. 
 
Summary 
Falling inflation and an undeveloped banking system characterize the 
macroeconomic climate in Russia over the period of 1994-1998. The banking system was 
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still very much undeveloped and was hit at least twice by financial crises as well as two 
large devaluations of the ruble. There was very limited credit provided to the industry 
from the banking sector. 
The post-privatization ownership structure has started to change, with the 
outsiders share growing but having a little impact on the industrial output, which had 
continued to fall. Firms’ financial position had deteriorated and their debt levels had 
risen. 
Non-payment of taxes had been growing. The government has introduced 
kartoteka, a collection method of tax debt. The cases of bankruptcy were almost 
unknown prior to 1998. 
The use of non-monetary transactions had been growing. More and more firms 
got involved in non-monetary exchange. Firms had intensified their use of non-monetary 
transactions. 
Non-monetary transactions are apparently not an industry specific phenomenon, 
all branches of industry use non-monetary payments. Construction materials industry had 
used non-monetary exchange most intensely. Food and other branches closer to the 
consumer market had lower levels of use of non-monetary payments. 
Non-monetary exchange is also found in all regions, but lower shares are detected 
in Moscow (Central region) and St. Petersburg (North-West). In-kind exchange does not 
seem to be a purely regional phenomenon. 
Firms of all ownership types and even de novo firms had used non-monetary 
transactions rather intensely in 1998. Ownership does not seem to determine the use of 
non-monetary transactions. 
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Overall, non-monetary exchange seems to be an economy-wide phenomenon. 
Factors pertaining to the economy as a whole must be initiating such widespread use of 
non-monetary instruments. 
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Chapter 4. Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
Prior to the rise of non-monetary exchange in Russia and other transition 
countries, there have been only a few studies of non-monetary payments. There have 
been a lot more studies of monetary transactions and money. Indeed, money has been 
invented a long time ago. First historical records describing money in the form of silver 
bars date back to the reign of Hammurabi in Egypt, 1792-1750 BC. 
Governments and private entities had issued money. Timberlake (1987) describes 
a widespread use of what was called “scrips” (notes) in colonial America. Most wages in 
remote mining areas were paid in the company scrips, which could be redeemed in a 
company store. The use of scrips and other company-issued money was legal at that time 
that, according to Timberlake, contributed to the extensive use of such private money. 
Most studies of money and monetary exchange considered barter as a prehistoric 
form of trade, starting with Jevons (1875), who argued that the main function of money is 
to eliminate a need for barter. 
However, one can imagine an ideal barter economy where there is no need for 
money. Such barter economy is possible, argues Madden (1975), if there are a great 
enough number of barter transactions.  
More practical studies of the modern barter contributed to our understanding of 
causes of barter in international trade and developed economies. Marin and Schnitzer 
(1995) explain 10-15 percent of reciprocal exchange in international trade as a solution to 
the moral hazard problem of highly indebted developing countries. Prendergast and Stole 
 49
(1996), and Magenheim and Murrell (1988) conclude that barter in developed economies 
is used when prices are sticky (due to obligations to existing customers, for example), in 
which case barter helps to lower prices in a non-obvious way. Stodder (1998) makes 
another interesting contribution, reporting counter-cyclical behavior of barter in 
developed countries. 
But the real challenge for the modern economics is the phenomenon of 
abnormally extensive use of non-monetary transactions by firms in Russia and some 
other transition economies. The discussion is centered on three main hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis links the rise and proliferation of non-monetary payments to 
the liquidity and credit squeeze in the economy (Commander and Mumssen (1998), 
Brana and Maurel (1999), Ellingsen (2000), Commander et al. (2000)). The second 
hypothesis claims that barter28 is a superior committing device when contract 
enforcement is weak (Marin and Schnitzer (1999), Marin et al. (2000)). The third 
hypothesis disputes the first hypothesis on the ground that firms just pretend to be 
                                                
28 Commander and Mumssen (1998) and Pinto et al. (1999) combine all non-monetary forms under the 
common name “barter” on the ground that, as most explicitly stated in Commander and Mumssen, offsets 
and promissory notes are, in essence, derivatives of barter or, at least, very close substitutes. This research 
supports this view; the focus of this research is avoidance of the formal monetary system. Any form of non-
monetary payment is a way to avoid a payment with money. In the light of this consideration, this study 
uses the word “barter” to refer to any non-monetary payment where there is no explicit explanation that 
only the barter form of payment is considered. Using barter as a common name does not, however, imply 
that all non-monetary forms are the same. Important differences among them have been noted in Chapter 2. 
Moreover, as empirical tests will later demonstrate, veksels are quite different from other forms of non-
monetary payment. 
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liquidity constrained whereas the main cause of barter is resistance to restructuring 
(Gaddy and Ickes (1998a and b), Guriev and Ickes (1999), Pinto, Drebentsov, and 
Morozov (1999)).  
In the next three sections I will critically review these hypotheses. I will also 




Commander and Mumssen (1998) and, later, Commander, Dolinskaya, and 
Mumssen (2000) use a survey of about 300 Russian firms in their analysis of barter. 
While there is no explicit model in either paper, both papers offer a verbal argument and 
provide empirical analysis.  
The main idea of these papers is that barter arises when companies face liquidity 
problems and cannot borrow money. Liquidity problems arise when firms lack working 
capital to finance current operations. Barter is viewed as a substitute for bank credit for a 
liquidity-constrained firm. Indeed, if the recipient of barter goods cannot sell or use barter 
goods right away, it has effectively granted a credit to the supplier of barter goods. 
However, if credit in money is associated with a risk of non-payment, barter avoids this 
risk because the recipient of barter goods gets the goods right away instead of waiting for 
a monetary payment “later or never.” This is the essence of the liquidity hypothesis. 
Developing the argument, Commander et al. (1998) finalize their reasoning 
arguing that barter reallocates credit among firms, thus improving their overall efficiency, 
but it does not create credit inside industry. The authors propose that the state sector is 
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and was the net creditor29 of the production sector. Credit is given as a rolled over debt 
(i.e. tolerance of arrears) and acceptance of in-kind payments for taxes and utilities. 
Commander et al. (2000) have used data from their survey to find support for the 
liquidity hypothesis. Despite various regressions, the measure of liquidity is based on a 
subjective opinion of managers about the financial state of the firm and thus results of 
such analysis can be misleading, especially taking into account counter-evidence found in 
Guriev and Ickes (1998). 
 
Committing Device 
Marin and Schnitzer's hypothesis (1999), later further developed by Marin, 
Kaufmann and Gorochowskij (2000), explains the rise of barter as a solution to the moral 
hazard problem of firms with regard to the firms’ monetary payment for supplies when 
the payment enforcement system is weak, and when the supplier and the customer are 
locked in a bilateral monopoly situation. A formal model explains the argument. 
Without going too much in detail, the argument unfolds as follows. Several 
assumptions are made. The first assumption is that the supplier and the customer are in a 
bilateral monopoly situation so that the value of the input outside their relationship is 
zero. Second, the customer is assumed to be liquidity and credit constrained (alike the 
first hypothesis) so that the customer cannot pay for the input delivery on the spot but 
only when the final good, produced from the input, is sold. Third, the payment 
enforcement system is assumed to be very costly. 
These assumptions create a moral hazard problem. The customer has a strong 
                                                
29 Indeed, recall from the previous chapter that firms are on average net debtors. 
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incentive to divert its monetary payment from the deal once its output is sold. 
Anticipating such behavior on the part of the firm, the supplier may refuse to deliver 
inputs in the first place. In a situation like this, the customer may ensure that the 
transaction will happen, according to Marin and Schnitzer, delivering a “barter good” as a 
payment for inputs. A mutually beneficial transaction takes place and the overall output 
decline in the Russian economy is less pronounced. 
The authors acknowledge the fact that the customer may cheat the supplier with 
the barter good as it would with the monetary payment. However, in the model, the 
supplier can prevent the customer from selling the barter good elsewhere. A particular 
mechanism behind this proposition is left unexplained.  
Although assumptions made in the argument seem to have validity in the case of 
Russia, where bilateral monopoly situations should be quite common, conclusions do not 
seem to be well justified. The supplier obviously has an incentive to insure that his 
delivery is paid for but the authors simply assume barter’s superior enforcing properties 
to justify the use of barter. The authors explain that goods are less anonymous than 
money, so it is easier to enforce barter contracts. However, Russian commercial laws 
treat barter and monetary transactions similarly – any obligation must be paid. Central to 
the argument “weak contract enforcement” is an issue in other countries. Barter, 
however, did not become the dominant mode of exchange there.  
Marin and Schnitzer’s empirical tests of the argument use regression analysis 
explaining firm’s growth by the size of arrears and the share of barter in sales. 
Considering statistically significant relationships, use of barter seems to be negatively 
related to firms’ growth that is quite opposite to the model’s prediction. The model’s 
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prediction – the reverse relationship – was found significant in one specification only, for 
firms having arrears larger than 40 percent of sales. This result does not appear to be 
robust as also an omission of the “bankdebt” variable gives an opposite and significant 
sign. Validity of their test is also questioned by a very small, only 24 observations, size of 
the sample. 
It thus appears that although the weakness of the legal system and the structure of 
the economy are responsible for a part of the growth of barter in Russia as my later tests 
will demonstrate, Marin and Schnitzer’s argument does not satisfactory explain why 
barter is used instead of a monetary payment.  
 
Virtual Economy 
The virtual economy hypothesis stands out as the one with the strongest 
assumptions. The manufacturing sector is assumed to be destroying value, i.e. 
manufacturing firms are assumed to produce goods, which sell for less than the cost of 
their production. 
Gaddy and Ickes call the Russian economy a virtual economy because prices are 
distorted through barter thus making it possible for survival of otherwise inefficient 
manufacturing sector. To make the argument work, Gaddy and Ickes argue that all 
economic agents prefer the virtual economy to the real one. 
They propose that barter is a chosen survival strategy for unviable manufacturing 
firms in Russia (Gaddy and Ickes (1998a)). The unviable manufacturing firms initiate, 
support, and survive through barter and the virtual economy instead of exiting or 
restructuring. The government also supports the virtual economy because those employed 
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in manufacturing are perceived as an important part of the electorate. Through the foreign 
trade and price controls, the government manipulates the extracting sector (Gaddy and 
Ickes (1998b)),30 which has nothing to do but to follow the government’s objectives. 
The virtual economy argument has become very popular.31 The most 
controversial assumption, which has attracted much attention, is the value-destroying 
nature of the Russian manufacturing.32 The authors justify this assumption referring to 
the Soviet past when manufacturing goods were over-priced and resources under-priced. 
However, the majority of manufacturing companies may appear value destroying 
if a large part of their costs is a payment to the energy sector monopolies. Unfortunately, 
the problem of monopoly pricing did not receive much attention in the argument, whereas 
it can be important. The manufacturing sector may seem value-destroying as long as it 
purchases energy from natural monopolies at monopoly prices and not at the marginal 
cost that would make the manufacturing sector value-adding. Of course, the world and 
domestic prices of energy differ when compared at the exchange rate, but the whole 
system of domestic prices is different from that of the world. Interestingly enough, a 
study by Guriev and Ickes (1999), which supposedly further develops the virtual 
economy argument, assumes that the Russian energy monopolies price above the 
marginal cost (see more on this point in the next section). 
                                                
30 See a formal critique of Gaddy and Ickes’ four-sector virtual economy model (1998b) in Makarov and 
Kleiner (1999). 
31 See the newly published book by Gaddy and Ickes (2002) “Russia’s Virtual Economy”. 
32 As it is proposed in Menshikov’s letter (2000), the very concept of value destruction does not seem 
adequate. A better term, from the economics standpoint, is depression. 
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According to the virtual economy paradigm, Russian manufacturing firms survive 
by inflating their prices so that, at the end, the extracting sector has to pay for their 
inefficiency. However, Marin et al. (2000) did not find unfair terms of barter trade 
between the extracting and manufacturing sectors in their empirical analysis. 
Guriev and Ickes (1998) is probably the most direct empirical study of the virtual 
economy hypothesis. This study has examined the relationship between barter and labor 
productivity. I have repeated exact tests used by Guriev and Ickes and have received 
results similar to theirs: labor productivity was found to be associated with a larger share 
of barter in sales.33 Guriev and Ickes’ interpretation of this finding is that it supports the 
virtual economy argument: low productivity firms sell for barter whereas high 
productivity firm sell for money. However, another explanation is also possible: low 
liquidity (=less productive if a firm is reluctant to adjust employment34) firms resort to 
barter. 
Overall, the virtual economy hypothesis makes an important contribution to the 
economic debate about the fate of the Russian economic reform. Indeed, much needs to 
be done to become a developed market economy. Hence the critical view of Russian 
manufacturing sector draws attention to its problems. However, when non-monetary 
payments are considered, the virtual economy hypothesis does not provide a convincing 
argument why they have grown so much. As in the case with the unjustified assumption 
in Marin and Schnitzer, the authors here also make an unjustified assumption about 
                                                
33 It is also a good test of my data in relation to other data. Results are reported in Appendix C. 
34 Russia had surprisingly high employment levels (about 95 percent) despite severe depression (40 percent 
decline of GDP) in 90s.  
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barter’s superior masking properties that make Russian economy virtual.35  
 
Other Explanations 
Besides the three main hypotheses reviewed above, there are other studies, which 
either develop peripheral arguments of these hypotheses or combine them in some way. 
Brana and Maurel (1999), for instance, claim to find evidence that “good” firms use non-
monetary payments as a substitute for credit and liquidity shortage, following 
Commander and Mumssen (1998), while “bad” firms use non-monetary payments as a 
way to avoid costly restructuring as in Gaddy and Ickes (1998a and b). 
Pinto, Drebentsov, and Morozov (1999) claim that Russian economy still 
experiences non-trivial soft budget constraints that manifest themselves through the 
tolerance of non-payment of taxes and implicit subsidization of the manufacturing sector 
through barter with extracting sector.  
Guriev and Ickes (1999) use a model by Guriev and Kvasov (1999) in the 
empirical tests to claim that barter can be a form of price discrimination. In the model, by 
assumption, the monopolist offers two types of sale contracts, one for cash, and the other 
for barter.36 An implication of this assumption is that the average value of output received 
                                                
35 It seems possible to imagine a system where monetary prices are distorted to the same extend. 
36 Does Gazprom (and other natural monopolists) indeed offer a menu of contracts? My conversations with 
managers of AO Altaienergo suggest that natural monopolies do not offer a menu of contracts from which 
the buyers self-select but do the selection themselves based on the history of relations with a particular 
firm. Knowledge, which is certainly imperfect, of the financial situation of a buyer, dictates a method of 
payment. Firms in deep distress pay with their output or in veksels whereas profitable firms are demanded 
cash only. 
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through barter is higher that the monopoly’s marginal cost. In effect, Guriev and Kvasov 
assume my earlier point of criticism regarding the value-destroying nature of the 
manufacturing sector: the manufacturing sector appears to be value-destroying as long 
as it purchases inputs from the extracting sector at a monopoly price but not at the 
marginal cost. 
In any model of price discrimination, another implicit assumption is the 
separation of markets. It means that buyers cannot or are not willing to re-trade the 
monopoly good among themselves. In the case of barter, this assumption can be 
questioned since there is a thick intermediaries market for barter goods. For evidence, see 
Commander, Dolinskaya, and Mumssen (2000). 
Most of studies attribute a secondary role to the tax evasion37 as a cause of non-
monetary exchange, except for the claim of Kuznetsov (2000) regarding the development 
of a “new industrial organization.”38 To date, empirical evidence on tax evasion, 
                                                
37 Taxes are named problem number one of doing business in Russia in the survey by Expert, No. 42, 1999, 
pp. 23-28. Korostikova T. (2000) “Kormushka Dlia Bankrotov I Chinovnikov,” in Argumenty i Fakty 
weekly, No. 3, 2000 cites newspaper Paninter, No. 6, May 1999 regarding information about existing 
textile concern “Paninter”. With a gross profit margin of 25 percent, the concern is unprofitable: it still 
owes 28,000 rubles in taxes under the tax regime of that time. 
38 Pavel Kuznetsov (2000) from the Center for Economic Reform at the Government of the Russian 
Federation calls the non-monetary system a “new industrial organization.” Firms are implicitly – for the tax 
police and, unfortunately, for researchers – integrated into a coherent system, where financial flows are 
separated from physical flows so that researchers, as well as the tax police – cheating on taxes being named 
the prime cause of this system – observe non-monetary exchange and indebted firms while untaxed 
unnoticed monetary income is generated in some affiliated company. 
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unfortunately, is available only in the form of managers’ answers to a direct question on 
tax evasion (see, for example, Commader and Mumssen (1998), Hendley, Ickes, and 
Ryterman (1998), Aukucionek (1997), Pinto et al. (1999), Marin et al. (2000)), which is 
thus subject to an under-reporting bias. 
Theoretical studies suggested that barter and other forms of non-monetary 
payments have become institutionalized39 in Russia. The main contribution to the 
argument has been made by Russian economists,40 most notably, Polterovich (1999). In a 
simple model Polterovich shows that if transaction costs of barter decline with the 
number of participants, two equilibria can be supported: monetary, where no agent uses 
barter, and barter, where everyone uses barter. Introduction of, what Polterovich calls, 
transformation costs ensures multiple equilibria, where any level of barter can be 
supported as a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, Polterovich develops a useful set of tools 
to describe what he calls an institutional trap – an inefficient stable equilibrium emerging 
during transition as a response to major shocks to the economic system. 
It is important to draw attention to one of the first policy-oriented studies of barter 
by Hendley, Ickes, and Ryterman (1998). They have closely examined taxation and 
payment systems in Russia, blaming their fundamentals for the growth of barter. While 
there was very limited empirical evidence supplied in support of their conclusions, the 
kartoteka phenomenon has been defined, described, and attributed a role in the growth of 
barter. However, without providing convincing empirical evidence, the question “By how 
                                                
39 The most explicit examples are Guriev and Ickes (1998) and Pinto et al. (1999). See also a work on 
institutionalization of wage arrears by Earle and Sabirianova (2000). 
40 See also a work of Makarov and Kleiner (1999). 
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much does kartoteka influence barter?” has remained open. The present study will not 
only answer this question, but will also demonstrate that kartoteka is a very important 
factor facilitating the growth of barter and non-monetary payments. 
 
Summary 
Before the rise of non-monetary exchange in Russia there has been only a few 
studies of non-monetary exchange. Barter is often regarded as a pre-historical form of 
exchange that was replaced by a more efficient monetary exchange where there is no 
need for a double coincidence of wants. Barter existing in developed economies was 
usually regarded as a way around contractual obligations or as a solution to the moral 
hazard problem of the cash starved partner on the other end of transaction. James Stodder 
(1998) has also found evidence for counter-cyclical behavior of barter in developed 
countries. 
There are many studies of non-monetary exchange in Russia. Most studies, 
however, can be attributed to one of the three main hypotheses. The first hypothesis links 
the rise of barter to the lack of credit and liquidity in the manufacturing sector. Firms 
with liquidity difficulties and no access to credit use non-monetary transactions with 
other firms to compensate for non-existing credit. They barter with the government to 
receive implicit subsidies through higher barter prices. The present study supports the 
liquidity argument, and will provide evidence on the liquidity causes of barter.  
The second hypothesis explains the use of barter and other non-monetary 
transactions as a solution to the moral hazard problem when firms are locked in a 
bilateral trade. Barter is claimed to be a superior committing device when contract 
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enforcement is weak. However, superior committing properties of barter are not well 
justified in the argument. Assumptions of the model do not cover all of the 
manufacturing. Besides, the empirical evidence is not comprehensive. Therefore, this 
hypothesis, providing an interesting contribution to the study of barter, does not 
satisfactory answer the question “Why there was an explosion of barter trade in Russia?” 
The third hypothesis claims that barter is an element of a new economic 
organization called the “virtual economy.” Unviable manufacturing firms survive through 
bartering with extracting monopolies. I have offered counter evidence and criticism of 
this hypothesis. 
Overall, all three hypotheses provide useful insights for the explanation of the 
growth of non-monetary trade in Russia. However, the reviewed hypotheses suffer from 
the lack of empirical support or from weak arguments. The overall goal of the present 
study is not only to present a comprehensive explanation for the growth of non-monetary 
payments, but also, and may be most importantly, to find other factors which contributed 
to the growth of non-monetary economy in Russia and which have been missed in the 
previous research. Such attempt will be undertaken in the next chapter. 
 61
Chapter 5. A Contribution to Explanations of Non-Monetary Exchange 
 
Introduction 
Despite the many, often contradictory, explanations about the rise of non-
monetary exchange reviewed in the previous chapter, several questions still remain 
unanswered. Among them: 
• Does the lack of liquidity indeed cause non-monetary trade? 
• If so, can the lack of liquidity alone explain the growth of non-monetary 
payments? 
• What makes non-monetary exchange so stable? 
Using two data sources – the survey described in Chapter 1, and the balance sheet 
data of most Russian firms collected by Goskomstat – as well as observations about the 
environment in which firms operated and still operate in Russia, I will propose some 
possible answers to these questions. 
In what follows, I will first return to the liquidity hypothesis. It seems the most 
obvious point to start – liquidity is mentioned in all of the reviewed works. Some 
researchers view it as important, other view it as misleading. 
In the first section, I will re-test specification offered by Guriev and Ickes who 
treat the liquidity argument as misleading. Contrary to Guriev and Ickes’s results, my 
data, in the same setting, supports a link between liquidity and non-monetary payments. 
In order to strengthen support for the liquidity argument, I construct an additional 
test using information about large and medium size firms in Russia. This test strongly 
supports the liquidity argument: liquidity matters and it is an important factor behind the 
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growth of non-monetary trade. 
Next I look for other factors that could have contributed to the growth of non-
monetary trade. The practice of tax collection, kartoteka, seems to be an obvious 
candidate for inspection. As I have mentioned before, kartoteka should have an important 
effect on the use of non-monetary trade. 
In order to quantify the effect of kartoteka, I run several tests which show that 
kartoteka was an important factor determining the level of non-monetary payments. 
About 10 percent of the use of non-monetary payments appears to be linked to being on 
kartoteka. 
Lastly, taking both liquidity and kartoteka into account, I investigate their effects 
on non-monetary payments. I find that liquidity is an important initiator of non-monetary 
exchange, whereas kartoteka contributes to its continuous use. 
 
Revisiting the Liquidity Hypothesis 
In many surveys, the liquidity problem was the most common answer of managers 
to the question about the reasons for barter.41 Although this answer is probably biased 
upwards, for example to induce state assistance, it is intuitively clear that if a firm did not 
                                                
41 For instance, Commander and Mumssen (1998) present the following most important reasons as 
measured by the percent of answers to the question about reasons for non-monetary trade: 
Reason   Barter Offsets Veksels 
Liquidity of partner 74 73 66 
Liquidity at own firm 72 73 68 
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have money to pay for inputs, barter is a good option to continue operations under the 
economic conditions in Russia in 1994-1998: severely limited credit and the bankruptcy 
(payment enforcement) mechanisms that did not work. Recall from Chapter 3 that the 
issued credit was below 10 percent of GDP and that less than one percent of firms were 
under bankruptcy proceedings. At the same time losses were widespread. 
Interestingly, in liquidity crisis a barter transaction can be preferred to a regular 
(monetary) transaction by the producer of the barter good and its supplier. Liquidity crisis 
of the producer means that it is very costly for him/her to wait for the sale of the barter 
good. Hence, there are gains from trade – the waiting time of the sale – that can be 
divided. I offer an example of such a situation in Appendix B. However, in order for the 
argument to work, one has to assume liquidity problems and the unavailability of external 
financing. 
To date, empirical analysis of the liquidity hypothesis has given contradictory 
results. Commander et al. (1998, 2000), using an indirect measure of liquidity, have 
presented evidence for a link between illiquidity and non-monetary transactions. On the 
other hand, a study by Guriev and Ickes (1999), found no significant relationship between 
liquidity and barter.  
Why do Guriev and Ickes’ results show no relationship? Are their results an effect 
of the particular data sets they use? To answer these questions I have put their 
specification for a test using my data. I have followed their specification42 as closely as 
possible:  
                                                
42 A rationale for this specification is briefly discussed in Guriev and Ickes (1999) and I will not repeat it 
here since the mere purpose of this exercise is to re-test their results using new data. 
 64
Barter in sales 98i = a0 + a1 Liquidity 96i + a2 Size 97i + a3 Exports 98i+ A4 INDUSTRY 
DUMMIESi + εi, where43 
Barter in sales 1998 is the ratio of barter to output, 
Liquidity 96 is the ratio of the ‘monetary means’ item from the balance sheets that 
encompasses cash, money in the current ruble account, money in the foreign currency 
account, and ‘other monetary means’ to total revenue in 1996, 
Size 97 is a log of employment in 1997, and 
Exports 98 is exports to the West as a ratio of output in 1998. 
I report the results of the test in Table 5 below.  
 
Table 5. Liquidity and Non-Monetary Payments: Repeating Guriev and Ickes’ Test 







































Tobit: Pseudo R2 
OLS: R2  .115 .118 .16 
N  185  350 
N (depvar=0)  46  na 
N (depvar=1)  1  na 
 
 
                                                
43 The summary statistics and the precise definitions of variables that I use are given in Appendix A. 
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Notes: 
1. M.E. = marginal effect. Standard errors are in parentheses. Results for the industry dummies and the 
constant are not reported. 
2. Bold indicates significance at a level of 10 percent or less. Significance: ***=1 percent, **=5 
percent, *=10 percent. 
3. SITF=results from “Survey ‘Inside the Transforming Firm’” of 1999, G&I = results from Guriev 
and Ickes (1998). 
4. Pseudo R2 = S/(S+Var_hat), where S=stddev(X’b_hat)*(N-1)/N, stddev = standard deviation, b_hat 
is a matrix of ML estimates of coefficients, and Var_hat is a ML estimate of variance. This is a 
measure of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) which is proved the most applicable to the Tobit model, 
see Veall, M.R. and Zimmermann, K.F. (1994) “Goodness of fit measures in the Tobit Model”, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 56. 
 
I report results of the TOBIT regression, which is a more appropriate specification 
because the measures of barter are limited from below and above, and thus the OLS 
regression has non-conventional error terms. OLS estimates are given only for direct 
comparison with Guriev and Ickes (1998) results. 
Results of the tests suggest that barter is influenced by past liquidity problems: the 
more money is in the firm’s possession, the less barter it uses.  
Guriev and Ickes (1998) claim to have an unbiased measure of liquidity, 
constructed from companies’ financial statements. I have also used companies’ financial 
statements to construct my liquidity measure.44 Therefore this discrepancy in results 
should be attributed to differences in data. 
                                                
44 The liquidity measure was constructed from the balance sheets data reported in the database GNOZIS, 




To build up further support for the liquidity hypothesis, I have decided to 
strengthen every aspect of the test reported in the previous section. First, I have acquired 
a database collected by Goskomstat in 1997-99, consisting of the balance sheets of most 
large and medium size Russian companies. Thus I have substantially increased the 
sample size since I have found a way to proxy for non-monetary payments using these 
data. 
Second, I have reconstructed the measure of liquidity. The old measure did not 
take into account claims on firm’s liquidity. “Monetary holdings” were simply adjusted 
by the firm’s size (sales or revenue). The new measure pays more attention to firm’s net 
financial standing using “payables” as a weight for the same numerator. As a result, 
Liquidity (LIQ) = End of Year Monetary Balance / Payables, 
or how much money there is at the end of year per one ruble of payables.  
To illustrate this measure, let’s consider two firms with the same monetary 
holdings (or even same volume of sales). The firm having less accounts payable will have 
a higher liquidity index – it has more unclaimed cash which can be used for purchases. 
The other firm, on the other hand, is constrained in purchases given its account payable 
are enforceable. If the liquidity hypothesis is true, it is more likely that the second firm 
will engage in non-monetary trade. 
With this measure of liquidity, which is identical to a “coefficient of liquidity” 
used in standard financial calculations in Russia,45 I have tested its relation to non-
                                                
45 Defined as “an indicator of the ability of a company to promptly settle its short-term financial liabilities.” 
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monetary sales, defined as: 
Non-Monetary Sales (NMS) = 1 – (Monetary Sales / All Sales) 
To give this test more credibility I have also included last year’s reported profit 
per employee (PE) as a variable capturing company’s financial standing. This variable 
can potentially influence the amount of used non-monetary sales (if under-performing 
companies use a greater proportion of sales in non-monetary form). 
To control for other firm specific characteristics, size (measured by a log of 1997 
employment), location, and industrial affiliation are also included in the analysis. 
Since, according to the balance sheets data, about 18 percent of companies did not 
use non-monetary forms of trade in 1998, I estimated the following equation using one-
side TOBIT: 
NMS98 = a1NMS97 + a2LIQ97 + a3PE97 + b1size97 + b2region + b3branch + error 
term 
Estimates of the coefficients of this equation show by how much a firm’s previous 
year’s liquidity influenced its following year’s level of non-monetary payments. Other 
variables also taken into account include: 
- previous year’s non-monetary payments 
- last year’s profitability 
- size 
- location 
- industrial affiliation. 
                                                                                                                                            
Sometimes it is translated as a quick or cash ratio (and from Russian it can be translated as a “coefficient of 
absolute liquidity”). 
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Table 6 reports the estimation results. 
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Pseudo R2 = 0.24 
N = 4899 





1. What is reported are the marginal effects of the TOBIT regression. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Bold indicates significance at a level of 10 percent or less. Significance: 
***=1 percent, **=5 percent, *=10 percent.  
2. In the set of dummy variables, the omitted categories are the central region and the 
machine-building industry. 
3. Collinearity diagnostics, according to D. Belsley, E. Kuh, and R. Welsch (1980), did not indicate 
any critical problems (condition number is 16.06). 
4. Marginal effects are computed by LIMDEP using the following formula: ∂E[yi|xi]/∂xi = β × Prob(0 ≤ 
y*i ≤ 1) = β[Φ((1-β’xi)/σ) - Φ((-β’xi)/σ)], where β is the estimated vector of coefficients, σ is the 
estimated standard deviation of the distribution, y*i is the latent (unbounded) variable, yi is the 
observed (bounded) dependent variable, Φ is CDF of normal distribution, xi is the vector of means 
of independent variables. In effect, the coefficients are scaled down by a factor, which could be 
very roughly approximated by the proportion of non-limiting observations. 
 
The main result is that last year’s liquidity is found to be associated with non-
monetary sales. Despite other possible determinants of a firm’s non-monetary sales (such 
as previous year’s non-monetary sales, profitability, size, regional and industrial 
association), liquidity stands out as the significant factor negatively associated with the 
future use of non-monetary means of payment. 
There is a concern that this result is indicative of a simple identity 
NMS=1-MS, where MS and NMS are measures of the ratio of monetary and non-
monetary sales in total sales, respectively. 
If the constructed measure of liquidity (LIQ) and a measure of monetary sales in 
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total sales (MS) were closely related (also across 1998 and 1997), then the reported 
finding would simply confirm the above identity. 
Are LIQ and MS closely related? Collinearity diagnostics of the explanatory 
variables show that LIQ and NMS (or 1-MS) do not appear to be collinear. Therefore, 
across firms, there is no trivial linear or near-linear relation between these two measures. 
The lack of this relation can be explained by how these two measures are 
constructed. It is hard to imagine that a company's payables and sales behave in some 
trivial fashion (move in opposite directions?), although some very limited assumptions 
can be made in regard to monetary income over the year and the amount of monetary 
holdings at a particular date (move together?).  
Another interesting result of the regression is the disassociation of last year’s 
profitability and the following year’s non-monetary payments. Profit per employee is a 
commonly used measure of a firm’s viability. The finding that the share of used non-
monetary payments is linearly independent of a firm’s previous year profitability leads to 
the tentative conclusion that the use of non-monetary payments is not connected to the 
distress a firm is in. In other words, there is no systematic variation between profitable 
and unprofitable firms in regard to their use of non-monetary payments. Moreover, if 
profitability is moving in the same direction as productivity, this finding provides 
additional counter evidence to the “virtual economy” hypothesis. 
It is also important to note that profit per employee and the liquidity measure 
appear not to be collinear, as is supported by the BKW46 test. This suggests, therefore, 
that a firm’s liquidity problems and profitability (possibly even viability and 
                                                
46 D. Belsley, E. Kuh, and R. Welsch (1980). 
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productivity) are not related.  
To summarize, the most important finding is that illiquidity has an effect on the 
use of non-monetary payments. This raises two questions: why there was a dramatic 
decline of liquidity and what is the mechanism connecting illiquidity and non-monetary 
payments? Ivanenko (2003)47 proposes an answer to the first question: illiquidity is a 
consequence of the “unavailability of external funds” in Russia in the late 1990s.48 The 
second question is addressed in the following section. 
 
Kartoteka 
The present work is the first study to closely investigate the effect of kartoteka, a 
routine tax collection method of withdrawing overdue taxes from a firm’s bank account. 
One of the first studies of barter – a paper by Hendley, Ickes and Ryterman (1998) –
cautions about the possible negative effects of this tax collection method. Lack of data 
prevented these authors from making any definite conclusion about the magnitude of the 
effect of kartoteka, and thus kartoteka was attributed a necessary but secondary role. This 
study goes much further: it not only quantifies the effect of kartoteka, but also 
decomposes it for firms with different exposure to non-monetary payments. Most 
importantly, I will show that the effect of kartoteka is one of the prime factors 
influencing the level of non-monetary payments – especially for firms which are 
                                                
47 Ivanenko V. “Access to Liquidity and Non-monetary Trade”, Post-Communist Economies, 16(1), March 
2004. 
48 Similar claims are also made in The Gaidar Institute’s annual reports. See, for example, 
http://www.iet.ru/archiv/zip/1993.zip for 1993 (In Russian). 
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accustomed to the use of non-monetary payments. 
All of the other studies of non-monetary payments, the most important of which I 
have reviewed in Chapter 4, do not consider kartoteka explicitly, and none of them 
quantify its effect on non-monetary payments. A reason for this could be that kartoteka is 
not a well-known institution for those who do not closely study taxation practices in 
Russia. Also, given disorganization of the government enforcement mechanisms in 
Russia during the late 1990s, it is hard to predict a priori how strong an effect kartoteka 
has on non-monetary payments. 
I begin the investigation with Table 7, which shows the annual flows of firms to 
and from kartoteka. It is broken down by firms on and off kartoteka at the end of the 
previous year.  
Note that the number of firms on kartoteka has been steadily increasing from year 
to year. If at the end of 1991 less than 8 percent of firms were on kartoteka, by 1998 this 
number has had grown by more than 8 times. In 1998, the majority – more than 66 
percent – of firms in my sample were on kartoteka. The sample has good representative 
qualities, as I have described in Chapter 1, so I would argue that the majority of 
industrial firms in Russia were on kartoteka by 1998.49  
Moreover, kartoteka is a stable phenomenon. No less than 55 percent (75 percent 
on average) of firms, which got on kartoteka in year t-1, remained on kartoteka in year t.  
Furthermore, firms not on kartoteka are the ones that were not on kartoteka in the 
previous year. On average, 97 percent of the firms off kartoteka in the current year stayed 
                                                
49 Note also, recalling Chapter 3, that by 1998 the majority of transactions of Russian firms were carried out 
in non-monetary means. 
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off kartoteka the previous year.  
Lastly, flows off and on kartoteka are drastically different: on average, 25 percent 
of the firms off kartoteka in the previous year went on kartoteka in the next year, 
whereas, on average, only 3 percent of the firms on kartoteka in year t-1 went off 
kartoteka in year t. 
 
Table 7. The Rising Importance of Kartoteka 
  Year   Average
 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 over 
years
Percent of firms on 
kartoteka as % of 
total  7.78 12.82 21.88 35.88 48.48 59.62 66.39 66.67 39.94
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
of which    
On kartoteka the 
previous year, % of 
firms on kartoteka 88.89 57.78 55.84 62.20 72.57 79.26 87.65 93.50 74.71
Off kartoteka the 
previous year, % of 
firms on kartoteka 11.11 42.22 44.16 37.80 27.43 20.74 12.35 6.50 25.29
   
Percent of firms off 
kartoteka as % of 
total 92.22 87.18 78.13 64.12 51.52 40.38 33.61 33.33 60.06
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
of which 
On kartoteka the 
previous year, % of 
firms off kartoteka 0.31 0.33 1.09 0.00 1.08 3.40 4.07 13.01 2.91
Off kartoteka the 
previous year, % of 
firms off kartoteka 99.69 99.67 98.91 100.00 98.92 96.60 95.93 86.99 97.09
Total number of 
firms 
347 351 352 354 361 364 366 369 358
 
Source: Sample calculations. 
Note: Sample is made consistent for year-to-year comparisons. 
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Based on these observations, I conclude that firms were pushed onto kartoteka 
over the period of 1990-1998. The pushing factors were quite strong over this period, 
with the exception of 1998 when the inflow onto kartoteka had slowed (although it was 
still larger than the outflow). Over the same period, firms had only very weak incentives 
or opportunities to get off kartoteka. 
Recall from Chapter 3 that firms go on kartoteka when the tax debt becomes 
greater than a certain threshold for a certain period of time. Can firms avoid getting on 
kartoteka? Yes, if their tax obligations are promptly met. In the environment of the late 
90s in Russia, when the bankruptcy law did not yet punish those who did not honor their 
obligations, firms may have had an incentive to give a higher priority to a payment to 
suppliers, for example, than to a payment to the tax authorities. In a way, not paying the 
government can be a survival strategy for firms when credit is unavailable. Indeed, the 
worst that can happen for non-payment of taxes is kartoteka which can be avoided by an 
alternative (and legal) route – non-monetary methods of payment. My interviews with a 
tax inspector in Novosibirsk confirm that most firms had such priorities. 
For firms on kartoteka, incentives to be in the monetary zone drastically diminish. 
It does not mean that cash is less desirable; it means that using a bank account is not an 
attractive option. For example, a recipient of a bank transfer on kartoteka cannot use the 
money for anything because it will be taken as a payment for overdue taxes. For such a 
firm it is better to receive a non-monetary payment (let alone to make one). Note that if 
the other side to a transaction is a liquid firm off kartoteka, the firm on kartoteka may ask 
the liquid firm to pay in non-monetary means. Thus, kartoteka helps to spread the use of 
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non-monetary means. 
Kartoteka rules were, and still are, quite strict. In essence, the banks had to follow 
the government rules on a moment’s notice from a tax authority clerk. Interestingly, a 
somewhat similar tax enforcement system is in place in the United States. If income taxes 
are not paid, an Internal Revenue Services clerk may issue a bank levy which instructs 
the bank to freeze money in the account of the delinquent taxpayer on the date the levy is 
received and make a transfer to the IRS after 21 days. However, there is a possibility of 
negotiation or a court hearing. 
In the case of kartoteka, negotiation is also possible. But negotiation usually 
concerns only a temporary relief from the kartoteka status, often for one incoming 
payment only. The American bank levy system is a one-time shot (another levy is needed 
to initiate another withdrawal), whereas the Russian system requires a withdrawal of the 
kartoteka notice through another notice. Otherwise, the kartoteka status remains in effect. 
The Russian Civil Code states that certain claims must be honored before the tax 
claims. The Civil Code gives a higher priority to payments ordered by the court for cases 
regarding compensation for work-related health damage and for contracted work. But 
such claims seem minor, whereas tax claims concern a large portion of income. 
The kartoteka system was later also imposed for the unconditional withdrawal of 
payments for water, waste disposal, and the use of other utility services. Kartoteka was a 
draconian measure, given that the majority of companies in Russia in the late 90s lacked 
liquidity.50 Kartoteka deprived companies from using the banking system: money 
                                                
50 See Ivanenko (2003). 
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received in the account would simply disappear in the kartoteka “pigeonhole”.51 
Can firms get off kartoteka once they are on it? Yes, if it is worth paying the 
increased tax debt to gain access to the formal banking system. However, until the flow 
of liquidity resumes at a reasonable rate or the tax debt is restructured, it can be cheaper 
to continue to use the non-monetary system than to get into the monetary zone. The costs 
of the non-monetary system are larger than that of the monetary system due to complex 
trade arrangements and the lack of adequate information about the profitability of 
transactions.52 However, for the switch to the monetary zone, one has to compare the 
transaction costs of the non-monetary system and the costs of getting off kartoteka, or 
transformation costs53, which can be larger. In the late 90s, the penalties for the non-
payment of taxes were large54, so the tax debt quickly became a burden, which was hard 
or impossible to eliminate. 
Without a sharp and continuous decline of firms’ liquidity in the late 90s, 
                                                
51 Kartoteka in Russian literally means “a catalog system”, often used in libraries. Notes about borrowed 
books (or claims on funds) are stored in a pigeonhole. 
52 My father was once hired as a consultant to help assess the profitability of complex barter-offset 
arrangements. 
53 The terms “transformation costs” and “transaction costs” used in this manner have been introduced by 
Polterovich (1999). 
54 Penalties for the delay of tax payments were approximately equal to the Central Bank refinance rate. 
Thus, once a firm defaults on tax payments, the tax debt builds up interest as if the firm had borrowed from 
a bank. For the delay of a payment to the Pension Fund, for instance, the penalty was 0.3 percent of the 
debt for every day of delay, that is 109.5 percent annually (the average Central Bank refinance rate over the 
period 1994-1998 was 110.5). 
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kartoteka would not have played a central role in the facilitation of non-monetary trade. 
In essence, kartoteka is that missing link in the literature that connects illiquidity and 
non-monetary payments. Note that with recovery of liquidity inflows55 after 1998, the 
number of firms on kartoteka went down.56 
Kartoteka is also an institutional factor; its effect fits into Polterovich’s (1999) 
theory of institutional traps. It is something that cements an existing condition, 
complicating it so much that a shock is needed to get an economy out of such a non-
monetary equilibrium. In Russia, this shock was the devaluation of the ruble and the 
default of 1998, after which the Russian economy started to re-monetize. 
 
Kartoteka and Non-Monetary Payments 
To test the relationship between kartoteka and non-monetary payments, I use an 
                                                
55 As has been documented, the use of non-monetary payments had been increasing over the period 1994-
1998. However, in 1999, for the first time since the beginning of reforms, the opposite tendency was 
observed. Tsukhlo (2000) of the Institute for the Economy in Transition (Gaidar Institute) reports: “Based 
on answers to the dynamics of monetary and barter demand, one can obtain an index of substitutability for 
one and the other. Substitution of barter by monetary demand happens if the growth of monetary sales is 
accompanied by a decrease or non-increase of barter trade; non-growth of monetary sales – by a decrease 
of barter. As our calculations show, from August 1998 to January 1999 barter demand had substituted 
monetary demand. But its intensity, which peaked in October of 1998, has been declining. In February 
1999, the substitution of barter for monetary demand was observed for the first time. This tendency has 
been observed ever since. In February 2000, the index of substitutability reached its maximum: the 
monetary demand substituted barter demand in 23 percent of enterprises, the reverse process happening  
only in 7 percent.” This statement is based on a monthly survey of industrial companies. 
56 I will talk more about the state of affairs since 1998 in the Conclusion. 
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explanatory binary variable capturing kartoteka status at the end of year as it is reported 
by firm’s managers (0=off kartoteka, 1=on kartoteka), and a set of control variables, in 
regressions explaining the use of non-monetary payments for the purchase of inputs and 
for the sale of output. In the simplest test, the results of which are reported in Table 8 
below, the control variables are the lagged liquidity measure defined in the previous 
chapter, the firm size measured by the log of employment, and dummies for industry 
affiliation and location: 
NMP 98i = a0 + a1 Kartoteka 97i + a2 Liquidity 97i + a3 Size 97i + A4 INDUSTRY AND 
REGION DUMMIESi + εi 
Here, the year of measurement is at the end of the variable name. Kartoteka 97 is defined 
above, and NMP is the share of non-monetary payments in purchases or sales, and it is 
constructed using managers’ answers to the question about the percent of purchases/sales 
conducted in non-monetary and monetary means.  
Since an OLS regression assumes an unbounded dependent variable, the test 
should use the TOBIT regression, which assumes a latent dependent variable, not limited 
by 0 and 1. I should note that this is the only study, to the best of my knowledge, which is 
free of the statistical (non-conventional error terms) and interpretational (analysis of OLS 
coefficients) mistakes of other empirical investigations of non-monetary trade.  
Since liquidity was found to have a close connection to non-monetary payments, 
it is used as an independent variable in the regression explaining the use of barter and 
other non-monetary instruments. The additional rationale for its use is that it takes the 
liquidity effect off kartoteka. Thus, the coefficient on kartoteka measures not the lack of 
liquidity but the effect of having the bank account “blocked” by the tax authorities. 
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The firm’s size, industry affiliation, and location are the usual firm 
characteristics and control variables in analysis of firm behavior.  
 



































↓           
Inputs Kartoteka .177 *** .162 *** .094 ** .065 * .054  
 97 (.043)  (.043)  (.037)  (.037)  (.039)  
 Liquidity -.067  -.095  -.174  -.026  .016  
 97 (.121)  (.125)  (.234)  (.081)  (.047)  
 Size 97 .013  .014  .008  .011  .033 ***
  (.016)  (.016)  (.013)  (.013)  (.012)  
 Pseudo R2 .304  .287  .272  .147  .345  
 N 210  209  209  210  210  
 N 
depvar=0 




15  9  3  2  0 
 
Output Kartoteka .159 *** .140 *** .086 *** .051 * .007  
 97 (.041)  (.038)  (.031)  (.031)  (.024)  
 Liquidity -.059  -.064  -.147  .002  -.007  
 97 (.077)  (.100)  (.222)  (.065)  (.027)  
 Size 97 .032 ** .018  .003  .010  .021 ***
  (.015)  (.013)  (.012)  (.011)  (.007)  
 Pseudo R2 .464  .405  .319  .263  .579  













1. What is reported are the marginal effects of the Tobit regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Results for the constant, the industry and regional dummies are not reported. 
2. Bold indicates significance at a level of 10 percent or less. Significance: ***=1 percent, **=5 
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percent, *=10 percent. 
 
Being on kartoteka the year before is associated with a greater use of barter in the 
following year: this holds true considering offsets and barter together, and all types of 
non-monetary payments combined. Note that the strength of the relationship increases 
from barter to the combination of barter and offsets. The strongest relationship is found 
for the effect of kartoteka on all types of non-monetary payments combined. Therefore, 
kartoteka is mostly related to the decision to stay away from the monetary system as a 
whole. 
One may argue, however, that this relationship between kartoteka and the use of 
non-monetary payments does not mean that kartoteka influences the use of non-
monetary payments. For instance, a reverse causality may be at work. The use of non-
monetary payments in the past may lead to both kartoteka and the future use of non-
monetary payments. 
To check for this possibility, I also include the 1994 level of non-monetary 
payments in the regression. Results of this specification are reported in Table 9. 
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side Indep.var↓           
 NMP 94 .540 *** .556 *** .777 *** .649 *** .131  
  (.067)  (.066)  (.069)  (.082)  (.107)  
inputs Kartoteka .150 *** .127 *** .061  .047  .024 * 
 97 (.048)  (.046)  (.039)  (.035)  (.014)  
 Liquidity -.044  -.080  -.155 * -.026  .007  
 97 (.048)  (.050)  (.091)  (.036)  (.013)  
 Size 97 .009  .014  .017  .000  .009 ***
  (.020)  (.019)  (.012)  (.014)  (.001)  
 Pseudo R2 .526  .554  .758  .499  .360  
 N 190  190  190  190  190  
 N 
depvar=0 
24  26  49  57  120  
 N 
depvar=1 
12  6  2  1  0  
 NMP 94 .428 *** .478 *** .678 *** .513 *** .200 * 
  (.065)  (.067)  (.073)  (.084)  (.110)  
output Kartoteka .150 *** .125 *** .052  .069 ** .006  
 97 (.043)  (.043)  (.038)  (.033)  (.017)  
 Liquidity -.022  -.033  -.133  .011  -.001  
 97 (.045)  (.047)  (.084)  (.035)  (.014)  
 Size 97 .023  .016  .001  .005  .006 ***
  (.018)  (.018)  (.015)  (.013)  (.002)  
 Pseudo R2 .613  .524  .718  .547  .587  








8  5  1  1  0  
 
Notes: 
1. What is reported are the marginal effects of the Tobit regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Results for the constant, the industry and regional dummies are not reported. 
2. Bold indicates significance at a level of 10 percent or less. Significance: ***=1 percent, **=5 
percent, *=10 percent. 
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Overall, these results are consistent with those in Table 8. They are a little lower 
on significance and values, but even the greatest difference – for all non-monetary 
payments57 – is small, a mere 2.7 percent. It is interesting to note that kartoteka has 
approximately the same “contribution” (in the range of 15-18 percent) to the explanation 
of growth (from 1994 to 1998) as well as to the level (in 1998) of non-monetary 
payments across firms.  
Even though kartoteka has withstood the reverse causality test, my results raise 
another question: What if kartoteka and non-monetary payments are consequences of 
some other force? Do “good” firms not use non-monetary payments and stay away from 
kartoteka, whereas “bad” firms do both?58   
One way to define “good” firms is to use a measure introduced in the previous 
section – profit per employee. Although profits exhibit great variation (due to the 
formation of markets, for instance) it is an adequate measure of a firm’s success.59 
                                                
57 It is also the most interesting (“staying away from the banking system”) as far as kartoteka is concerned. 
58 Economic studies have proved that simultaneity may matter a great deal in seemingly “conventional” 
settings. For instance, a study inspecting simultaneity of teen drinking and school attainment has supplied 
evidence that the relationship between the two reflects correlation rather than causation. See Dee, T. and 
Evans, W. N. (2003) "Teen Drinking and Educational Attainment: Evidence from Two-Sample 
Instrumental Variables (TSIV) Estimates" Journal of Labor Economics, 21, 1, 178-209. Unfortunately, in 
this study it was not possible to apply the usual approach to the simultaneity problem – the use of 
instruments. 
59 I have chosen this measure after experimenting with many others (and their combinations): cost, 
productivity, sales (growth, per employee), investment, state assistance, etc. All of them yielded the same 
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Table 10 reports the results of re-estimation with this “viability” measure as an 
independent variable. 
 


































side Indep.var↓           
 NMP 94 .539*** .556*** .780*** .645*** .130 
  (.067) (.066) (.069) (.082) (.107) 
inputs Kartoteka .139*** .115** .054 .041 .023 
 97 (.049) (.047) (.040) (.036) (.014) 
 Liquidity -.036 -.069 -.131 -.020 .008 
 97 (.040) (.094) (.838) (.432) (.213) 
 Profit/Emp -.050 -.052 -.046 -.029 -.008 
 97 (.039) (.038) (.041) (.028) (.016) 
 Size 97 .009 .013 .017 .000 .009***
  (.020) (.019) (.012) (.014) (.001) 
 Pseudo R2 .534 .564 .767 .507 .364 
 N 190 190 190 190 190 
 Ndepvar=0 24 26 49 57 120 
 Ndepvar=1 12 6 2 1 0 
 NMP 94 .427*** .478*** .678*** .513*** .192* 
  (.065) (.067) (.073) (.084) (.109) 
output Kartoteka .145*** .118*** .048 .064* .009 
 97 (.044) (.044) (.038) (.033) (.016) 
 Liquidity -.018 -.028 -.123 .016 -.002 
 97 (.032) (.069) (.670) (.285) (.242) 
 Profit/Emp -.018 -.024 -.017 -.019 .009 
 97 (.027) (.027) (.022) (.024) (.008) 
 Size 97 .023 .016 .001 .005 .006** 
  (.018) (.018) (.015) (.013) (.003) 
 Pseudo R2 .616 .603 .721 .553 .613 
 N 194 193 194 193 193 
 Ndepvar=0 16 20 46 44 100 
 Ndepvar=1 8 5 1 1 0 
 




1. What is reported are marginal effects of the Tobit regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Results for the constant, the industry and regional dummies are not reported. 
2. Bold indicates significance at a level of 10 percent or less. Significance: ***=1 percent, **=5 
percent, *=10 percent. 
3. Collinearity diagnostics, according to D. Belsley, E. Kuh, and R. Welsch (1980), did not indicate 
any critical problems (condition number is always less than 30). 
 
Here, there is also a decrease in the magnitude and significance of coefficients but again 
it is minimal: about 1 percent maximum. The profitability variable is found to be 
insignificantly related to non-monetary payments. Although some other unobservable 
firm characteristics may be simultaneously influencing profits, being on kartoteka, and 
the use of non-monetary payments, not much can be done beyond this test to control for 
this – there are limitations imposed by available data.  
In all the above tests kartoteka showed a certain influence over the use of non-
monetary payments. It is not surprising when a tax office clerk has more control of the 
bank account than the firm does! Should this not influence a firm’s decision to use non-
monetary payments? 
Consider the following situation. Imagine a sudden drop in liquidity. Now a firm 
can buy only half of what it used to. It cannot borrow and no one is lending. This is, more 
or less, the situation in which Russian firms operated in the late 90s according to 
Ivanenko (2003).  
In such circumstances, turning to non-monetary means of trade is a good option 
(also if prices are sticky). Incentives to choose this option increase if the banking system 
is “unavailable” due to unpaid tax obligations. In other words: kartoteka matters – firms 
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choose non-monetary trade because of kartoteka. 
Focusing attention on the reported marginal effects (coefficients scaled by the 
estimated probability that the latent dependent variable falls within 0 and 1) 60, I conclude 
that about 11-12 percent of barter and offsets happened because a firm was on kartoteka 
the year before. Veksels seem to be unrelated to kartoteka, but contribute to the effect of 
kartoteka when all non-monetary payments are considered together. The effect of 
kartoteka on all non-monetary payments is the strongest: Firms on kartoteka will use 
non-monetary payments by 13-14 percent more the following year. 
Coefficients on liquidity are found to have correct signs, but they are insignificant. 
It thus appears that there is a certain interplay between kartoteka and liquidity (as it 
should be by the definition of kartoteka). Analysis in the next section will clarify this 
interaction. 
Another significant coefficient indicates that larger firms use more veksels. 
Veksels, therefore, are quite different from barter and offsets: they are mostly unrelated to 
kartoteka and liquidity indicators (coefficients on these factors are insignificant and 
small). Clearly, veksels are a special form of non-monetary payments mostly influenced 
by the size of a firm.  
The lack of liquidity or being on kartoteka does not motivate firms to use more or 
less veksels. However, liquidity and kartoteka seem to have a stronger effect on all non-
monetary payments when veksels are considered jointly with barter and offsets. This 
                                                
60 A marginal effect equals the derivative of the dependent variable with respect to the change in the right 
hand side of the equation, evaluated at the estimated coefficients and the mean value of the independent 
variables. 
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indicates that the option to use veksels is important for the decision to avoid the use of the 
monetary system as a whole. 
The use of veksels was advocated on the government level as a measure to lessen 
non-monetary payments and arrears. The argument was that when a firm’s debt is 
formalized on paper – remember veksels are, in essence, commercial papers stipulating 
the amount of debt – this paper, not physical goods, would be the medium of exchange. 
However, as suggested by this research, veksels did not become such a medium of 
exchange at that time: their use was only about 5 percent of all modes of exchange. 
Obviously, credibility played an important role here. Repeating a citation from 
Commander and Mumssen, firms preferred “goods now versus money later or never,” 
even when money was promised in the form of a veksel. 
To summarize the empirical results of this section, I am making the following 
observations. 
1. Kartoteka is a robust, significant predictor of non-monetary exchange. The 
effect of kartoteka is always quite significant and large, especially when all non-
monetary payment options are considered. This finding suggests that kartoteka, in the 
environment of 1994-1998, had strongly and significantly contributed to the growth of 
the non-monetary economy. 
2. Veksels are found to be a special kind of non-monetary payments, positively 
related to a firm’s size but not related to kartoteka. This finding suggests that veksels are 
instruments closer to credit as they are by definition and that they are rather different 
from barter and offsets. This differentiates the present study from other research, which 
considered veksels jointly with barter. Nonetheless, veksels seem to factor in the decision 
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to avoid the monetary system as a whole: when veksels are added to the list of non-
monetary payment options, the marginal effect of kartoteka increases. Thus, having an 
option to use veksels matters for the effect of kartoteka. 
Finally, non-monetary payments, and barter in particular, are much influenced by 
institutional factors (approximated by the previous level of non-monetary payments). 
 
Kartoteka Cements Non-Monetary Exchange 
In this section I will investigate the effect of kartoteka in relation to liquidity. I 
have shown that liquidity is an important explanatory variable for non-monetary 
payments, as is kartoteka. Now I will answer the question: How do these two most 
important factors – liquidity and kartoteka – affect the behavior of firms with different 
exposure to non-monetary payments? 
The idea that the factors initiating and perpetuating non-monetary exchange are 
different has already been suggested by some researchers (e.g. Guriev and Ickes (1998) 
and Polterovich (1998)). Firms may have various motivations to use non-monetary 
payments for the first time and on a repetitive basis. 
One can imagine various motivations for the first use of barter and other non-
monetary means, but, obviously, the strongest motivation is the lack of cash. 
A firm working with non-monetary means on a repetitive basis obviously has 
extremely limited liquidity resources. Scarce cash quickly puts the firm on kartoteka. 
Kartoteka, in turn (as I have discussed in section above), provides a great disincentive61 
                                                
61 Based on their interviews with banks and firm managers, Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov (1999) argue 
that kartoteka can be easily avoided by opening multiple bank accounts or channeling transactions through 
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to return to the monetary system. 
My hypothesis is that lack of liquidity is the strongest motivation for the initial 
use of in-kind payments. For their continued use kartoteka is the prime motivation.  
Since I have observations on non-monetary payments for two points in time, 1994 
and 1998, I can test for the difference between firms that did use (“Incumbent”) and did 
not use (“Entrant”) non-monetary payments in 1994. I use the past level of non-monetary 
payments as a selection criterion because it appears to be the strongest, institutional factor 
affecting the use of non-monetary payments. 
In constructing the test I interact the variables of interest with a dummy variable 
equaling to 1 if the firm used non-monetary payments for output in 1994, and 0 
otherwise. To be more precise, if the firm used only monetary payments for output in 
1994, Kartoteka970 = Kartoteka97, and 0 otherwise. If the firm used some non-monetary 
payments for output in 1994, Kartoteka971 = Kartoteka97, and 0 otherwise. I have 
adjusted the measure of liquidity analogously. In the rest, the test is similar to the one, 
results of which are reported in Table 9.  
                                                                                                                                            
a related firm. However, this evidence also suggests that these actions impose extra costs on the sale of 






























































































   
   

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. What is reported are the marginal effects of the Tobit regression. Results for the constant, the 
industry and regional dummies are not reported. 
2. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***=1 percent, **=5 percent, * =10 percent significance. 
Bold indicates significance at a level of 10 or less. 
3. Significance of the Wald test speaks in favor of rejection of hypothesis. 
4. Collinearity diagnostics, according to D. Belsley, E. Kuh, and R. Welsch (1980), did not 
indicate any critical problems (condition number is always less than 30). 
 
Significant coefficients and the Wald tests suggest that lower liquidity seems 
to be the strongest motivation for barter for the entrant firms (i.e. those that did not 
use non-monetary payments in 1994). The same holds true for barter and offsets 
together, and all non-monetary means combined. As for kartoteka, it seems that the 
entrant firms on and off kartoteka do not employ non-monetary payments differently. 
For the incumbent firms, which used non-monetary payments in 1994, lower 
liquidity loses importance as an initiator of non-monetary payments. Being on 
kartoteka, however, becomes an important incentive for their use. 
Therefore, liquidity causes the initial use of non-monetary means. Firms adjust 
to the use of non-monetary exchange and are placed on kartoteka. Kartoteka makes 
the use of the non-monetary system an attractive option, while at the same time 
making it very difficult or nearly impossible to switch to the banking system. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter I have shown that a firm on kartoteka chooses a higher level of 
non-monetary payments than a firm off kartoteka. Kartoteka is found to be the 
strongest factor in the decision to choose the level of non-monetary payments for 
firms using non-monetary payments on a repetitive basis. Kartoteka is a significant 
 91
factor despite its possible relation to liquidity. By controlling bank accounts, tax 
authorities create a very strong disincentive for firms to use the banking system. 
It appears that the majority of Russian firms in the 90s experienced a sharp 
drop in liquidity that caused the initial use of non-monetary payments. Further use of 
non-monetary trade was connected to kartoteka, where most of the illiquid firms were 
placed by the late 90s. Due to the large tax arrears, it was very hard for firms to exit 




By the end of the 90s non-monetary trade in Russia embraced more than a half 
of all transactions. The speed at which firms were turning to non-monetary means was 
astonishing. Transition to the market economy has taken an unexpected root in 
Russia. 
When such a phenomenon takes place, usually there is no conventional theory 
available. This attracts new research: numerous articles and books were written on 
this topic in the 90s. However, when one attempts to piece all this literature into one 
coherent story, it feels like an unattainable goal. Answers explaining the growth of 
non-monetary trade have been many: no money, no restructuring, no enforcement… 
Different answers, often conflicting with each other. For instance, the most intuitive 
liquidity hypothesis was challenged by the virtual economy argument which viewed 
the “no money” story as misinterpreted. 
Without my own research I found it confusing to understand and explain why 
various forms of non-monetary exchange substituted monetary transactions and what 
fueled their growth. Besides, if the use of non-monetary payments was growing in the 
late 90s, this tendency has reversed after 1998 that was not anticipated by any theory. 
Luckily, I was an organizer of a large survey of Russian companies in 1999. 
Much effort has been put into design and organization of this survey that covered 
most Russian regions and all manufacturing branches. The survey asked about 300 
questions about different firm’s activities. Possibly, collecting and preparing such data 
was one of the main challenges of this study. 
I have used this data to offer a comprehensive explanation for the growth of 
non-monetary exchange. The data have supported several significant relationships, 
confirming my initial hypotheses. I have shown that the lack of liquidity played a 
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primary role in initiating non-monetary exchange. Furthermore, firms accustomed to 
non-monetary exchange were found to be motivated to use barter and non-monetary 
payments mainly by being on kartoteka. 
Although the liquidity argument has been proposed in the literature, it was 
challenged by the virtual economy hypothesis. Thus my first task was to clarify the 
relationship between liquidity and non-monetary payments. Using several carefully 
prepared datasets, such relationship was established. 
Marin and Schnitzer (1998) offered a hypothesis linking the lack of liquidity 
to the use of non-monetary payments. The link was seen in the superior payment 
enforcing properties of barter. However, unjustified assumptions of this hypothesis 
have substantially weakened this argument. The relationship between illiquidity and 
non-monetary payments remained unexplained. I argue that this relationship works 
through kartoteka, a practice of controlling bank accounts by the tax authorities.  
It is suggestive what managers had to say about possible reasons for obstacles 
to doing business in Russia. Not the lack of demand, not low investment – taxes and 
regulations, state policies62 were named the number one reason for making it difficult 
to work. This study confirms the managers’ claims. A sudden nation-wide tightening 
of liquidity has caused a large drop in firms’ liquidity that was followed by the use of 
non-monetary exchange. Large penalties coupled with a practice of kartoteka, made it 
very costly to use the banking system, and so the price the government had to pay for 
these policies was a shift of transactions into non-monetary economy. 
New findings suggest two, possibly different, policy measures aimed at 
decreasing the use of non-monetary payments. One measure should be aimed at 
                                                
62 As found in a survey about obstacles to doing business in Russia organized by Expert magazine and 
reported in No. 42, 1999, pp. 23-28. 
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preventing firms from exiting the monetary zone. The other measure should deal with 
firms that are not in the monetary zone. As I have shown, the two groups of firms (in 
and out the monetary zone) have different motivation in their selection of the level of 
barter and non-monetary payments. The monetary group would be more responsive to 
factors stimulating their higher liquidity position. For the second group, any anti-
kartoteka measure seems to be a way to decrease the use of non-monetary payments. 
The two measures could coincide, for instance in a large positive demand shock that 
happened in 1998. But the second group of firms needs a larger liquidity shock since 
it has to deal with elimination of the hanging overdue tax debt in order to achieve a 
kartoteka-free status that would stimulate returning to the monetary exchange. 
In 1999, for the first time since the beginning of reforms, it was recorded that 
the use of non-monetary payments had declined. Tsukhlo of Institute for the Economy 
in Transition (The Gaidar Institute) reports the following data in Expert, No. 27, 
2001: 
 
Table 12. Percent of Non-Monetary Payments in Sales by Industry 
Industry 1997 1998 2000  2001  
    Jan Mar May 
Electricity na na 48 15 10 13 
Ferrous Metals  73 54 27 26 16 15 
Non-Ferrous Metals 14 4 27 24 29 15 
Chemical 66 68 44 36 26 29 
Machine Building 69 62 43 38 29 31 
Wood 52 41 46 34 34 31 
Construction Materials 69 85 69 49 45 42 
Light 58 52 42 32 28 25 
Food 37 51 41 19 32 25 
All Industries  61 57 42 34 28 27 
 
Source: Lab for marketing research of the Institute of Transition. 
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For the industry as whole, the use of non-monetary means of payment had 
declined by more than a half from 1998 to 2001. What has changed since 1998? 
Since 1998 the Russian economy has started to grow at about 5 percent 
annually. Financial Times editorial of October 30, 2001 ascribes the growth of the 
economy to three basic factors: the extraordinary weakness from which the economy 
has grown, the rise in oil prices, and the structural reform. The editorial continues, 
“Russia's devaluation and debt default in 1998 was a blessing in disguise.” 
Indeed, after a large devaluation of the ruble in August 1998, domestic 
demand has switched to cheaper Russian goods. High oil prices have led to inflow of 
cash to the extracting sector and thus to the state. Liquidity has started to flow 
downstream, improving financial position of all branches: 
 











Electricity 101.5 101.8 100.2 
Fuel 106.2 105.0 102.4 
Ferrous Metallurgy 99.9 115.6 114.4 
Non-Ferrous Metallurgy 105.1 111.3 108.5 
Chemical and Petrochemical 106.6 114.3 121.7 
Machine Building and Metal Processing 107.7 115.5 115.9 
Wood and Paper 102.5 109.5 117.2 
Construction Materials 105.4 107.6 107.7 
Light 105.1 122.0 120.1 
Food 108.1 107.1 107.6 
Medicine 97.2 118.9 109.6 




The growth in demand and sales has improved the liquidity position of firms. 
Although the practice of kartoteka has remained in place, firms’ tax debts have been 
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restructured and partly written off.63 Evidence shows that firms have started to get off 
kartoteka: the percent of firms on kartoteka has dropped to 50 percent in 1999.64 
An infusion of liquidity, a decline of firms on kartoteka, and a greater use of 
the bankruptcy law have changed the equilibrium state of Russian economy. The 
number of monetary transactions has started to grow. 
Although events observed after 1998 are consistent with explanations 
proposed in this study, further research is needed, to clarify causes of the liquidity 
crisis, for instance. Moreover, how stable is the achieved monetary equilibrium? Will 
Russian economy ever return to the non-monetary equilibrium? The author plans to 






                                                
63 18 percent of tax arrears were unconditionally written off in 1998. Calculations are based on my 
data. 
64 Under a new initiative, firms in the described sample will be re-interviewed annually. Data for 1999 
and later years are still being processed. Kartoteka 1999 is one of the first readily available variables 




A. Definitions and Basic Statistics of Used Variables 
Variable Description Purpose 
NMP Sales 98 Share of non-monetary payments in 1998 
sales 
Dependent variable 
NMS 98 Share of non-monetary sales in 1998 
(calculated from appendix to balance 
sheets) 
Dependent variable 
NMS 97 Share of non-monetary sales in 1997 
(calculated from appendix to balance 
sheets) 
Measures institutionalization 
NMP Inputs 98 Share of non-monetary payments in 1998 
payment for inputs 
Dependent variable 
NMP Sales 94 Share of non-monetary payments in 1994 
sales 
Measures institutionalization 
NMP Inputs 94 Share of non-monetary payments in 1994 
payment for inputs 
Measures institutionalization 
Barter Sales 98 Share of barter in 1998 sales Dependent variable 
Barter Inputs 98 Share of barter in 1998 payment for inputs Dependent variable 
Barter Sales 94 Share of barter in 1994 sales Measures institutionalization 
Barter Inputs 94 Share of barter in 1994 payment for inputs Measures institutionalization 
Offsets Sales 98 Share of offsets in 1998 sales Dependent variable 
Offsets Inputs 98 Share of offsets in 1998 inputs Dependent variable 
Offsets Sales 94 Share of offsets in 1994 sales Measures institutionalization 
Offsets Inputs 94 Share of offsets in 1994 inputs Measures institutionalization 
Barter and Offsets 
in Inputs 98 
Share of barter and offsets in 1998 
payment for inputs 
Dependent variable 
Barter and Offsets 
in Sales 98 
Share of barter and offsets in 1998 sales Dependent variable 
Barter and Offsets 
in Inputs 94 
Share of barter and offsets in 1994 
payment for inputs 
Dependent variable 
Barter and Offsets 
in Sales 94 
Share of barter and offsets in 1994 sales Dependent variable 
Veksels Sales 98 Share of veksels in 1998 sales Dependent variable 
Veksels Inputs 98 Share of veksels in 1998 inputs Dependent variable 
Veksels Sales 94 Share of veksels in 1994 sales Measures institutionalization 
Veksels Inputs 94 Share of veksels in 1994 inputs Measures institutionalization 
Liquidity 96 Ratio of ‘monetary means’ item from the 
balance sheet that encompasses cash, 
money in the ruble current account, 
money in the foreign currency account, 
and ‘other monetary means’, to total 
revenue in 1996 
Measures liquidity (scaled by 
revenue) 
Liquidity 97 Ratio of ‘monetary means’ to payables at 
the end of 1997  
Measures liquidity (per ruble 
of debts) 
Liquidity 970 =Liquidity 97 if NMP Inputs 94=0, 0 
otherwise 
Measures Liquidity 96 only 
for firms which did not use 
non-monetary payments in 
1994 
Liquidity 971 =Liquidity 97 if NMP Inputs 94>0, 0 
otherwise 
Measures Liquidity 96 only 
for firms which did not use 
non-monetary payments in 
1994 
Kartoteka 97 On kartoteka in 1997 = 1, 0 otherwise Measures transaction costs of 
using the monetary system 
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Kartoteka 970 =Kartoteka 97 if NMP Inputs 94=0, 0 
otherwise 
Measures Kartoteka 97 only 
for firms which had not used 
non-monetary payments in 
1994 
Kartoteka 971 =Kartoteka 97 if NMP Inputs 94>0, 0 
otherwise 
Measures Kartoteka 97 only 
for firms which had used 




Profit/employment in 1997 (in 10,000 
rubles) 
Measure firm’s viability  




Log of labor productivity Measures performance 
Log of 
Employment 97 
Log of employment in 1997 Controls for size 




Construction materials = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for industry 
specificity 
Electroenergy Electroenergy = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for industry 
specificity 
Ferrous Metals Ferrous metals = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for industry 
specificity 
Food Food = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for industry 
specificity 
Fuel Fuel = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for industry 
specificity 
Light Light = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for industry 
specificity 




Non-Ferrous Metals = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for industry 
specificity 
Wood Wood = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for industry 
specificity 
Machine Building Machine building = 1, 0 otherwise Omitted category 
North North = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for regional specificity 
North-West North-West = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for regional specificity 
Povoljie Povoljie = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for regional specificity 
Volga-Vyatka Volga-Vyatka = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for regional specificity 
Central-
Chernozyom 
Central-Chernozyom = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for regional 
specificity 
North Caucasus North Caucasus = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for regional specificity 
Urals Urals = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for regional specificity 
West Siberia West Siberia = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for regional specificity 
East Siberia East Siberia = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for regional specificity 
Far East Far East = 1, 0 otherwise Controls for regional specificity 




Variable Obs. Mean Std. Err. 95% conf. interval 
NMP Sales 98 362 .544 .017 .509 .579 
NMP Sales 94 336 .342 .017 .307 .376 
NMS 98 5077 .570 .005 .560 .580 
NMS 97 4970 .110 .004 .102 .118 
NMP Inputs 98 360 .526 .019 .487 .564 
NMP Inputs 94 336 .342 .017 .307 .376 
Barter and Offsets in Inputs 98 357 .479 .019 .442 .516 
Barter and Offsets in Sales 98 360 .492 .017 .459 .526 
Barter and Offsets in Inputs 94 324 .325 .019 .288 .362 
Barter and Offsets in Sales 94 332 .325 .017 .292 .359 
Barter Sales 98 361 .247 .014 .219 .276 
Barter Sales 94 334 .186 .012 .162 .210 
Barter Inputs 98 358 .247 .015 .217 .277 
Barter Inputs 94 325 .191 .013 .164 .218 
Offsets Sales 98 361 .243 .013 .217 .269 
Offsets Sales 94 333 .136 .010 .116 .157 
Offsets Inputs 98 358 .230 .014 .202 .258 
Offsets Inputs 94 324 .133 .011 .111 .155 
Veksels Sales 98 361 .050 .006 .038 .062 
Veksels Sales 94 333 .016 .003 .009 .022 
Veksels Inputs 98 359 .041 .005 .030 .053 
Veksels Inputs 94 324 .014 .003 .008 .021 
Liquidity 96 219 1.062 .164 .739 1.385 
Liquidity 97 232 .155 .060 .036 .274 
Liquidity 97 (*) 5125 .119 .010 .101 .138 
Liquidity 970 340 .021 .006 .008 .034 
Liquidity 971 273 .106 .051 .005 .206 
Kartoteka 97 369 .667 .024 .618 .714 
Kartoteka 970 325 .148 .020 .109 .186 
Kartoteka 971 370 .535 .026 .484 .586 
Profit per employee 97 (*) 5453 2.865 .905 1.090 4.640 
Log of Employment 97 365 2.843 .035 2.773 2.913 
Chemical 377 .047 .010 .026 .069 
Construction Materials 377 .068 .013 .043 .094 
Electroenergy 377 .082 .014 .054 .110 
Ferrous Metals 377 .034 .009 .016 .052 
Food 377 .169 .019 .131 .207 
Fuel 377 .021 .007 .006 .035 
Light 377 .108 .016 .077 .140 
Medicine 377 .005 .003 -.002 .012 
Non-Ferrous Metals 377 .013 .005 .001 .024 
Wood 377 .021 .007 .006 .035 
Machine Building 377 .400 .025 .350 .450 
North 381 .031 .009 .014 .049 
North-West 381 .087 .014 .058 .115 
Povoljie 381 .092 .015 .063 .121 
Volga-Vyatka 381 .058 .012 .034 .081 
Central-Chernozyom 381 .060 .012 .036 .084 
North Caucasus 381 .126 .017 .093 .159 
Urals 381 .165 .019 .128 .203 
West Siberia 381 .079 .014 .052 .106 
East Siberia 381 .045 .011 .024 .065 
Far East 381 .031 .009 .014 .049 
Central 381 .226 .021 .184 .268 
* Goskomstat sample. 
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B. An Example of Mutually Beneficial Barter 
The situation when the price is time-dependent and there is no inexpensive 
credit may create a favorable environment for barter. In the example that follows, 
barter is a preferred mode of transaction over the monetary payment. 
Let us consider a transaction between two firms, the supplier and the 
customer. Each firm has certain money demand or liquidity preferences.65 Money can 
either be earned or borrowed. Here I will focus on the borrowed money or credit. 
Credit has three main characteristics: an amount, an interest, and duration. Thus the 
demand for money can be measured by these three characteristics. If the amount and 
duration are the same for two firms, a firm with higher money demand is willing to 
pay a higher interest or “price.” 
If the customer has a higher money demand than the supplier, that is for the 
same amount of cash borrowed for the same amount of time the customer is willing to 
pay more than the supplier, and there is no competitive credit market which could 
satisfy this money demand at the interest rate no larger than the supplier’s money 
demand, then both parties may prefer a payment in goods to a payment in money. 
In the environment of disorganization in Russia,66 search costs are quite high 
so that more marketing and search effort – which I measure by the time spent to find 
the highest paying customer – yield a higher price. The customer cannot wait to get 
the higher price because its demand for money is high. The supplier can wait because 
its demand is lower. The difference between the current and future value of the good 
represents trade surplus, a division of which benefits both parties if they use barter. 
                                                
65 Expressions “money demand” and “liquidity preferences” are used interchangeably in the text. 
66 See the Ph.D. dissertation by Racanitini (1998) from the University of Maryland on the importance 
of search costs in transition due to disorganization. 
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To see the point, consider the following. The customer's cash profits from the 
sale of the good, which it offers for barter, are Sc(t) = M(t)-Cc(t), where M(t) is the 
monetary income the customer gets if it sells the good at time t, and Cc(t) is the cost of 
waiting for time t. Cc(t) here depends on the liquidity preferences of the customer. 




R(x)dx, where R(x) is the price 
which the customer is willing to pay for the reduction of the sale time by one period at 
time x.67 Let’s assume that this marginal cost is higher for the customer firm (R) than 
for the supplier firm (r): R>r. Furthermore, for simplicity, let’s assume that R(x)=R, 
and r(x)=r. Hence the cost of selling the good by t for the customer and the supplier is 
Cc(t) = t·R, and Cs(t) = t·r, respectively. Let’s also assume that each agent gets the 
same cash from the sale at time t, M(t), that is each agent’s marketing skills and 
customers' preferences with respect to each agent are the same. Thus, receipts from 
the sale of the good at time t for the customer and the supplier are Sc(t) = M(t)-t·R and 
Ss(t) = M(t)-t·r. Hypothesized M(t), Cc(t) and Cs(t) are illustrated in Figure 12. 
                                                
67 For instance, the customer firm may not be able to start its production process without inputs that 
causes delay of the sale of output during which the due time of obligations may come up that may 
cause penalty costs per unit of time. 
 102
 
















The supplier will accept the good instead of the monetary payment as long as 
the value of the good for the supplier, Vs = maxt{Ss(t)}, is greater than the monetary 
payment for inputs. The customer will prefer to pay with the good as compared to 
money as long as the value of the good for the customer, Vc = maxt{Sc(t)}, is less than 
the monetary payment for inputs. Therefore, if Vc < P < Vs, where P denotes the 
monetary payment for inputs, barter is preferred by both parties to the monetary 
payment. Using the payment in money, both parties lose from dividing the trade 
surplus, [M(t")-t"·r]-[M(t')-t'·R], where t' and t" are the optimal times of sale for the 
customer and the supplier, respectively (in Figure 9, t' = 1st quarter, t" = 3rd quarter). 
Notice also that the good in the barter transaction is priced with a discount 
reflecting the waiting time. Evidence in Marin and Schnitzer (1999) suggests that the 
supplier indeed receives a substantial discount from the customer. 
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C. Performance and Barter: Repeating Guriev and Ickes’ (1998) Tests 
The basic equation of Guriev and Ickes used for a test of the association 
between labor productivity and barter is: 
llp97i = a0 + a1llp96i + a2(b97i – b96i) + a3profit96i + a4size96i. + εi 
My survey data does not have information on barter in 1997 and 1996 and so I 
use observations on barter in 1998 and 1994 that, according to Guriev and Ickes 
(1999), should only strengthen the test (“a more ideal test… would regress the change 
in labor productivity on the change in barter from an earlier period… Enterprises that 
invested in relational capital would have a large increase in barter since then…”). As 
a measure of profits I use the costs to output ratio (Guriev and Ickes claim that their 
results did not change when a measure of costs was used instead of the measure of 
profits). As a measure of size I use the log of output. Besides using a measure of only 
barter (b) as a dependent variable, I will also use a measure of barter and offsets 
combined (bo), and veksels (vek).68 
My estimation results are reported below along with estimates from Guriev 
and Ickes (1999). Basically, my results confirm those found by Guriev and Ickes. It 
seems that they had used a wider definition of barter since my results correspond to 
theirs only when I use a joint measure of barter and offsets. Note also that the use of 
veksels is insignificantly related to labor productivity. 
                                                
68 Measures of the use of non-monetary payments are constructed using answers to a question on 
percent of sales paid in non-monetary forms. 
 104
 
























      
b98  -.410* 
(.251) 
     
b94  .245 
(.328) 
     
bo98 
- bo94 
  -.380** 
(.185) 
    
bo98    -.470** 
(.204) 
   
bo94    .247 
(.225) 
   
vek98 
- vek98 




































     -0.42** 
(0.17) 
 
b97       -0.52** 
(0.20) 

































N 201 201 200 200 200 150 150 
R2 .479 .480 .483 .485 .476 0.83 0.83 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***=1 percent, **=5 percent, *=10 percent significance. 
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D. Questionnaire in English 
 
       
Region code  Sample point  No of interviewer  No of questionnaire 
 
Industrial Enterprises Survey - 99. Part 1. 
HELLO! 
Let me introduce myself. I am an interviewer of the Fund of Public 
Opinion. 
We ask you to participate in the survey of industrial enterprises. It 
is not difficult. I will be reading a question to you and possible answers 
to it. You can choose the answer which corresponds the most to your 
opinion, give your own answer or refuse to answer. Sometimes answers 
will be presented by a card which I will be giving to you. In this case, it is 
sufficient just to say the number of your answer. 
We guarantee confidentiality of the information which we will 
receive. 
We are grateful in advance for your cooperation! 
 
NAME OF THE COMPANY   
1.  The enterprise exists from month           19 __ __ year 
2. The enterprise has been founded in month           19 __ __ year 
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LAST, FIRST AND MIDDLE NAME OF THE INTERVIEWER:  
__________________________________________________________ 
 






Q U E S T I O N N A I R E 
General instructions:  
Enterprise below is defined as legal entity or main legal predecessor, 
which was this enterprise in the corresponding year. 
When answering questions, always write down units. Usually, for 
monetary data all numbers for 1991-1994 were in thousands of old (before 
denomination) rubles. Data for 1995-1997 were in millions of old rubles. After 
the denomination, data are in thousands of denominated rubles. May be it 
would be more convenient to give numbers in thousands of rubles throughout 
the questionnaire. 
 
If information is not available for some particular question please put 
the “-“ sign in the appropriate cell of a table. If you are sure that some 
variable was equal to zero please use “0” to indicate this. For example in 
question 232, if you are sure that there were no former employees 
among hired in some particular year, put "0" in the corresponding cell of 
the table. If there were former employees but it is impossible to get 
information for this question, use the “-“ sign. 
 
Outline of sections: 
1. History of the firm 
2. Management 
3. Privatization process 
4. Ownership 
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5. Corporate governance 
6. Social relationships at the enterprise 
7. Supplies, sales and payments 
8. Technology 
9. Employment 
10. General information about the enterprise 
11. Payments to the employees of the enterprise 
12. Activities of the enterprise 
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[TO BE ANSWERED BY A MANAGER WHO HAVE WORKED AT THE 
ENTERPRISE FOR A LONG ENOUGH PERIOD OF TIME. FOR EXAMPLE, 
DEPUTY MANAGER] 
 
1. History of the Firm 
LET US BEGIN BY TALKING ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF YOUR 
ENTERPRISE. 
 
1. 80-IES: PLEASE, TELL US, DID YOUR ENTERPRISE EXIST IN 1986 OR 
NOT? 
1. Yes          =>    Write in position 1 of the insert "January 1986" and 
go to Q. #6 
2. No 
 
2. DID YOUR ENTERPRISE EXIST IN ANY FORM, FOR INSTANCE, AS A 
PART OF SOME OTHER ENTERPRISE IN 1986 OR NOT? 
1. Yes          =>    Write in position 1 of the insert "January 1986" and 
go to Q. #6 
2. No 
3. DID YOUR ENTERPRISE EXIST IN ANY FORM IN 19.. OR NOT? 
/INTERVIEWER! ASK IN TURN ABOUT 87, 88, ETC. YEARS BEFORE YOU 
GET AN ANSWER "YES". AS SOON AS YOU GOT THE ANSWER "YES", 
WRITE THIS YEAR IN POSITION 1 OF THE INSERT AND GO TO Q. #4/ 
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 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
1. Yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2. No 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 
/INTERVIEWER! DO NOT FORGET TO WRITE THE YEAR IN POSITION 1 
OF THE INSERT./ 
 
4. IN WHAT APPROXIMATELY MONTH WAS YOUR ENTERPRISE 
FOUNDED IN 19[    ][    ] ? 
/INTERVIEWER! READ YEAR FROM POSITION 1 OF THE INSERT./ 
1. January 4. April 7. July 10. October 
2. February 5. May 8. August 11. November 
3. March 6. June 9. September 12. December 
   13. difficult to answer 
 
/INTERVIEWER! COPY THIS ANSWER IN POSITION 1 OF THE INSERT./ 
 
5. DID YOUR ENTERPRISE HAVE A PREDECESSOR IN 1986 OR NOT? 
1. Yes 
2. No           =>   go to Q. #10 
6. WHAT WAS PREDECESSOR’S NAME IN 1986? /IF THERE WERE 
MULTIPLE PREDECESSORS, THEN ASK FOR THE MAIN ONE AS IT 
WOULD BE DEFINED BY THE RESPONDENT./ 
_______________________________________________________ 
7-8. IN WHAT YEAR AND, APPROXIMATELY, MONTH, WAS THE 
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PREDECESSOR ORIGINALLY FOUNDED, STARTED TO OPERATE? 
7. YEAR  
      1 ___ ___ ___  
 
8. MONTH 
1. January 4. April 7. July 10. October 
2. February 5. May 8. August 11. November 
3. March 6. June 9. September 12. December 
   13. difficult to answer 
 
9. TO WHAT MINISTRY WAS YOUR ENTERPRISE OR ITS 
PREDECESSOR SUBORDINATED IN 1986? 
__________________________________________________ 
10. NOW WE WOULD LIKE TO TALK ABOUT CHANGES OF THE 
BOUNDARIES OF YOUR ENTERPRISE, THAT IS WHEN EMPLOYMENT 
OR ASSETS CHANGED BECAUSE OF SPLIT-UPS OR MERGERS. HAS 
ANYTHING LIKE THAT HAPPENED WITH YOUR ENTERPRISE? 
/INTERVIEWER! SHOW CARD #1 TO THE RESPONDENT./ 
 
CHECK THE LIST OF POSSIBLE REORGANIZATIONS TAKEN FROM THE 
NEW LEGAL CODE AND TELL US: STARTING WITH 19[    ][    ] /READ 
YEAR FROM POSITION #1 OF THE INSERT/, HAS ANYTHING FROM THE 
LIST HAPPENED OR NOT? 
1. Yes 
2. No    =>  Copy month and year from position #1 of the insert into 
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position 2 and go to instruction before questions #16-21. 
11-15. STARTING FROM 19[    ][    ] YEAR (READ YEAR FROM POSITION 1 
OF THE INSERT), LET'S TALK ABOUT REORGANIZATIONS OF YOUR 
ENTERPRISE, IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, STARTING WITH THE 
VERY FIRST ONE. /INTERVIEWER! ASK QUESTIONS 11-15 FOR EVERY 
SUBSEQUENT REORGANIZATION./ 
 # of  reor gan iz ati on  
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
11. TYPE OF 
REORGANIZATION 
       
1. split-up 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2. merger (involves legal 
registration of a new 
legal entity based on 
two or more 
predecessors) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3. spin-off, your 
enterprise is the one 
which spun off and 
there was its legal 
registration as a 
new legal entity 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4. spin-off, your 
enterprise is the one 
from which an 
enterprise was spun 
off and there was no 
legal re-registration 
of your enterprise 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5. acquisition 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6. reorganization of legal 
entity of one type to 
another type (change 
of legal form) without 
any of the above 
changes 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
7. other, please enlist 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
        




19_ _ 19_ _ 19_ _ 19_ _ 19_ _ 19_ _ 19_ _ 
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13. IN WHAT, 
APPROXIMATELY, 
MONTH DID THIS 
REORGANIZATION 
HAPPEN? 
__ __ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
        
14. AS A RESULT OF 
THIS 
REORGANIZATION 
DID THE NUMBER 
OF EMPLOYEES 
INCREASE, DID 
NOT CHANGE, OR 
DECREASE? 
       
1. increase 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2. did not change 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3. decrease 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4. difficult to say 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
        
15. BY HOW MANY 












% % % % % % % 
 
DID ANY OTHER REORGANIZATION HAPPEN AFTER THE ONE WE 
HAVE JUST TALKED ABOUT? 
 
INTERVIEWER! IF REORGANIZATION OF THE TYPE "1", "2", OR 
"3" HAS HAPPENED, THEN COPY YEAR AND MONTH OF THE LAST SUCH 
REORGANIZATION IN POSITION 2 OF THE INSERT, IF NOT -- THEN COPY 
YEAR AND MONTH INTO POSITION 2 FROM POSITION 1 OF THE INSERT. 
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16-21. INTERVIEWER! IF IN POS. 2 OF THE INSERT YOU HAVE JANUARY 
1986, THEN GO TO Q. #44 (SECTION 2), IF THERE IS A LATER DATE, THEN 
CONTINUE TO ASK QUESTIONS 
 
LET US CALL /READ MONTH AND YEAR FROM POSITION 2 OF 
THE INSERT/ A DATE OF FOUNDING OF YOUR ENTERPRISE AND ALL 
THE QUESTIONS, WHERE IS A REFERENCE TO THE DATE OF 
FOUNDING, REFER TO THIS VERY DATE. 
 
16. HOW WAS YOUR ENTERPRISE CALLED AT THE DATE OF 
FOUNDING? 
________________________________________________________________ 
17. WHAT WAS YOUR ENTERPRISE'S LEGAL FORM AT THE DATE OF 
FOUNDING? /SHOW THE CARD OF LEGAL FORMS AND CIRCLE 
RESPONDENT’S ANSWER IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE./ 
 
CARD #2 
 1. Federal state enterprise                          =>             go to question #44 
section 2 
 2. Municipal enterprise                               =>             go to question #44 
section 2 
 3. Limited Liability Company 
 4. Closed Joint Stock Company 
 5. Open Joint Stock Company 
 6. Cooperative 
 7. Small enterprise 
 8. Partnership (any kind) 
 9. Other, please 
describe___________________________________________________ 
 




2. No  =>   go to Q. #20 
19. WHAT WAS THE NAME OF THIS AUTHORITY AS OF THE FOUNDING 
DATE? 
_________________________________________________________ 
20. ESTIMATE (APPROXIMATELY) THE SHARE (IN %) OF EQUIPMENT 
USED (WAS LEASED, BOUGHT, TRANSFERRED BY SOME 
ARRANGEMENT) BY YOUR ENTERPRISE AT THE MOMENT (RIGHT 
AFTER) ITS FOUNDING WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY USED BY 




21. ESTIMATE (APPROXIMATELY) THE SHARE (IN %) OF YOUR 
EMPLOYEES AT THE MOMENT OF FOUNDING WHICH PREVIOUSLY 
WORKED FOR THE ENTERPRISE-PREDECESSOR (PREDECESSORS) 
OR THE FOUNDERS. 
___________________ % 
 
22. WE DO NOT NEED TO KNOW THE NAMES OF THE FIRM’S 
FOUNDERS. WE ONLY WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE 
TYPES OF YOUR FOUNDERS. 
 
DID YOUR ENTERPRISE HAVE FOUNDER-BLOCKHOLDERS 
WHICH CONTRIBUTED 5 OR MORE % OF THE CHARTER CAPITAL OF 
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THE ENTERPRISE ON [    ][    ] MONTH 19[    ][    ] /READ MONTH AND 
YEAR FROM POSITION 2 OF THE INSERT/, I.E. ON THE DATE OF 
FOUNDING (IN OUR DEFINITION)? 
1. Yes 
2. No     =>   go to Q. #27 
LET'S TALK ABOUT THEM. /INTERVIEWER! GIVE THE 
RESPONDENT CARDS #3 AND 4. ASK QUESTIONS #23-26 FOR EVERY 
BLOCKHOLDER./ 
 
# founder 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 5th 7th 8th 9th 10th
           
23. PLEASE, SELECT 
THE TYPE OF THE 
FOUNDER USING 
CARD #3 
          
1 . federal state 
authority 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 . local state authority 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 . enterprise-
predecessor 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4 . managers of the 
former enterprise-
predecessor 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 . non-managerial 
employees of the 
former enterprise-
predecessor 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6 . Russian bank 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
7 . Russian holding 
company 
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
8 . Russian investment 
fund or other non-bank 
financial institutions 
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
9 . other Russian legal 
entities 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
10 . other Russian 
physical persons 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
11 . foreigners 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
           
24. WHAT % OF 
CHARTER CAPITAL 
DID THIS FOUNDER 
CONTRIBUTE? 
% % % % % % % % % % 
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25. BEFORE THE 
FOUNDING OF YOUR 
ENTERPRISE, DID 
THE FOUNDER 
WORK IN THE 
BRANCH, WORK IN 
WHICH IS THE MAIN 
ACTIVITY OF YOUR 
ENTERPRISE? 
          
1 . yes 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 . no 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
           
26. WHO WAS THE 
FOUNDER AT THE 
FOUNDING DATE? 
/CARD #4. MULTIPLE 
ANSWERS 
PERMITTED./ 
          
1 . non-managerial 
employee of your 
enterprise 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 . manager of your 
enterprise 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 . customer of your 
enterprise 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4 . supplier of your 
enterprise 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 . creditor of your 
enterprise 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6 . competitor to your 
enterprise 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
7 . intermediary 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
8 . nothing from the 
above 
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
 
INTERVIEWER! IF THE RESPONDENT SAYS THAT THERE WERE NO 
OTHER BLOCKHOLDERS-FOUNDERS ON THIS DATE, THEN GO TO Q. #27. 
IN ANY OTHER CASE, ASK QQ. #23-26 
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27. WERE THERE SMALL FOUNDERS, THAT IS THOSE WHO 
CONTRIBUTED LESS THAN 5% OF THE CHARTER ENTERPRISE? 
 Yes..........................1 
 No............................2 =>   go to Q. #44, section 2 
LET'S TALK ABOUT THEM. 
WERE THE SMALL FOUNDERS OF YOUR 
ENTERPRISE... 
Yes No % of the 
charter 
capital 
28-29. ... local state authorities? 1 2  
    
30-31. ... federal state authorities? 1 2  
    
32-33. ... enterprise-predecessor? 1 2  
    
34-35. ... managers of your enterprise? 1 2  
    
36-37. ... non-managerial employees of your 
enterprise? 
1 2  
    
38-39. ... other, not yet mentioned, Russian legal 
entities? 
1 2  
    
40-41. ... other, not yet mentioned, Russian 
physical persons? 
1 2  
    




INTERVIEWER! READ THE DATE OF FOUNDING FROM POSITION 2 OF 
THE INSERT. 
 
STARTING WITH [    ][    ] MONTH 19[    ][    ], LET’S TALK ABOUT ALL 
HEADS OF YOUR COMPANY IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER. 
 
WHEN THE MANAGER, WHO WAS IN THE POSITION ON [    ][    ] MONTH 
19[    ][    ], STARTED TO WORK IN THIS POSITION? 
 
MANAGER 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
44-45. DATE OF 
ENTERING THE 
POSITION 
       
month __  __  __  __  __  __  __  
year 19__ __ __  __  __  __  __  __  __  
        




       
1 . in the same company 
or its predecessor 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 . in the parent company 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 . inside the industry, 
outside the company 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4 . other, specify 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 . difficult to say 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
        
47. IS (S)HE STILL THE 
TOP MANAGER? 
       
1. yes   =>   go to Q. # 53, 
section 3 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2. no 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
        
48-49. IN WHAT YEAR 
AND, APPROXIMATELY, 
MONTH DID THIS 
MANAGER LEAVE THE 
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POSITION? 
month __  __  __  __  __  __  __  
year 19__ __ __  __  __  __  __  __  __  
        
50. WAS THE 
DEPARTURE 
CONNECTED WITH A 
SPLIT-UP OR MERGER? 
       
1 . yes, it was: because of 
the merger (acquisition) of 
enterprises 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 . yes, it was: because of 
the split-up (spin-off) of 
enterprises 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 . yes, it was: because of 
the merger (acquisition) 
and simultaneous split-up 
(spin-off) of enterprises 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4 . no, it was not 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 . difficult to say 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
        
51. WHAT WAS THE 
MAIN REASON FOR 
DEPARTURE? /CARD # 5/ 
       
1 . fired or forced to quit 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 . voluntary quit to new 
job (had an opportunity to 
remain in the position) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 . forced leave to new job 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4 . voluntary retirement 
(had an opportunity to 
remain in the position) 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 . forced to retire 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6 . demotion within 
company 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
7 . death 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
8 . forced recall to parent 
company 
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
9 . voluntary quit for parent 
company 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
10 . other, specify 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
11 . difficult to say 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
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INTERVIEWER! QUESTION #52 SHOULD BE ASKED IF AS AN ANSWER TO 
Q. #51 YOU GOT ANSWERS 1, 3, 5 OR 8. GIVE THE RESPONDENT CARD #6 
FOR THE ANSWER. 
 
MANAGER 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
52. WHO WAS THE MOST 
ACTIVE IN INITIATING THE 
DISMISSAL (FORCING THE 
LEAVE)? /CARD #6/ 
       
1 . federal government agency 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 . local government agency 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 . bank 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4 . other firm 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 . workers of the firm (work 
collective) 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6 . other managers 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
7 . new owner 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
8 . other influential group 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 





53. HAS YOUR ENTERPRISE BEEN PRIVATIZED, I.E. ALL OR A PART 
OF THE FIRM WAS TRANSFERRED FROM THE STATE TO PRIVATE 
OWNERSHIP? 
1. Yes 
2. No        =>   go to Q. #62 
NOW I WILL READ POSSIBLE TYPES OF PRIVATIZATION. NAME ALL 
WHICH YOUR ENTERPRISE HAS GONE THROUGH. 
Type Yes No
54. Sale of the whole company by auction, commercial or 
investment tender 
1 2 
   
55. Option 1 of privileges given to the work collective 1 2 
   
56. Option 2 1 2 
   
57. Option 3 1 2 
   
58. Lease buyout 1 2 
 
59. Other, describe 
 
[IF NECESSARY, EXPLAIN THE OPTIONS: 2ND = SALE OF 51% OF 
VOTING SHARES TO THE WORK COLLECTIVE, 1ST = FREE TRANSFER OF 
25% OF NON-VOTING SHARES AND SALE OF 10% OF VOTING SHARES TO 
THE WORK COLLECTIVE, 3RD = SALE OF 20% OF VOTING SHARES TO 
ADMINISTRATION UPON THE COMPLETION OF THE PLAN OF 
RESTRUCTURING.] 
 
QUESTION #60 HAS TO BE ASKED ONLY TO THOSE WHO ANSWERED 
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"YES" TO QUESTION #55 
 
60. HAS YOUR ENTERPRISE CONVERTED PREFERRED (NON-VOTING) 
SHARES OF TYPE A INTO COMMON (VOTING)? 
1. Yes 
2. No     =>  go to Q. #62 
 
61. WHAT PERCENT OF ALL TYPE A SHARES? 
 ___________________________% 
 
62. HAS YOUR ENTERPRISE EVER BEEN IN THE STATE OF 
BANKRUPTCY BY THE DECISION OF THE ARBITRAGE COURT OR 
ANY OTHER AUTHORITY? 
1. Yes 
2. No      =>   go to question #85, section 4 
Was your enterprise... Date of entering this 
stage(approximately, if 
necessary)? 
For how many 
months has it 
been introduced? 





[    ][    ] 
65. Year 
[    ][    ] 
66. ________ 
   





[    ][    ] 
69. Year 
[    ][    ] 
70. ________ 
   





[    ][    ] 
73. Year 
[    ][    ] 
74. ________ 
   
75. ... at the stage of 76. Month 78. ________ 
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tender production [    ][    ] 
77. Year 
[    ][    ] 
 
79-84. WHO INITIATED THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE OR BROUGHT 
THE CASE TO THE ARBITRAGE COURT? 
 Yes No 
79. BANK 1 2 
   
80. OTHER FIRM 1 2 
   
81. FEDERAL STATE AUTHORITY 1 2 
   
82. LOCAL STATE AUTHORITY 1 2 
   
83. WORKERS OF THE ENTERPRISE 1 2 
   




INTERVIEWER! CHECK USING THE DATE OF FOUNDING OF THE 
ENTERPRISE (POS. 2 OF THE INSERT) WHETHER THE FIRM EXISTED IN 
1994. IF IT DID, THEN ASK QUESTIONS FOR BOTH DATES: FIRST ASK 
ALL QUESTIONS ON JANUARY 1, 1999, AND THEN -- ON JULY 1, 1994. IF 
THE FIRM DID NOT EXIST, THEN ASK QUESTIONS ONLY FOR JANUARY 
1, 1999. 
 
WE DO NOT NEED TO KNOW THE NAMES OF THE FIRM’S 
OWNERS, BUT WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE TYPES OF 
OWNERS AND % OF OWNERSHIP THAT THEY HELD. 
 
[IF IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET PRECISE NUMBERS, THEN ASK FOR 













85, 97. local 
state 
authorities? 
85. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
97. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
     
86, 98. federal 
state 
authorities? 
86. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 











87. Yes..1 => % 
_______  
No....2 =>   
go to Q. #90 
99. Yes..1 => % 
_________ 
No....2 =>   
go to Q. 
#102 
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88. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
100. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
     
89, 101. non-
managerial 
workers of your 
enterprise? 
89. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
101. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
     







90. Yes..1 => % 
_______  
No....2 =>   
go to Q. #94 
102. Yes..1 => % 
_________ 
No....2 =>   
go to Q. 
#106 
     





91. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
103. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
     






92. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
104. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
     
93, 105. 
foreigners? 
93. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
















go to Q. 95 
 -8 – diff. to say=> 
go to Q.96 
106 
________people=> 
go to Q. 107 
 -8 – diff. to say=> 













-8 – difficult to 




-8 – difficult to 
say=> 
 go to Q. #109 






A 100 OR 
LESS? 
96  108  
1. exactly or more 
than 100 
 1  1 
2. less than 100  2  2 
3. difficult to say  3  3 
 
109. SINCE THE MOMENT OF FOUNDING OF YOUR ENTERPRISE ON [    
][    ] MONTH 19[    ][    ] YEAR /READ MONTH AND YEAR FROM 
POSITION 2 OF THE INSERT/, WAS YOUR ENTERPRISE EVER MORE 
THAN 50% STATE OWNED? 
 Yes...........................1 
 No............................2 => go to Q. #112 
 
110. AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, IS THE STATE OWNERSHIP MORE 
THAN 50% OF THE CHARTER CAPITAL OF YOUR ENTERPRISE? 
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 Yes...........................1 => go to Q. #112 
 No............................2 
 
111. IN WHAT MONTH AND YEAR DID YOUR COMPANY BECOME 50% 
NON-STATE OWNED? 
[    ][    ]month 19[    ][    ] year 
 
112. NOW WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT ANY OUTSIDE 
BLOCKHOLDERS, DEFINED AS NON-STATE, NON-EMPLOYEE 
OWNERS HOLDING 5 OR MORE % OF OWNERSHIP OF THE 
ENTERPRISE. WERE THERE ANY SUCH BLOCKHOLDERS ON 
JANUARY 1, 1999 OR ON JULY 1, 1994? 
 Yes...........................1 
 No.............................2 => go to Q. #118, section 5 
# of blockholder 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10t
h 
113. TELL ME, 
PLEASE, WHAT 




          
1. Russian bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2. enterprise-
predecessor 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3. Russian holding 
company 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4. Russian 
investment fund 
and other non-bank 
financial institutions 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5. other Russian 
legal entities 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6. Russian 
individuals => go to 
Q. #115 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
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7. foreigners             
=> go to Q. #115 
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
           
114. WHO HELD 




          
1. state (federal or 
municipal level) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2. private legal or 
physical persons 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 







ER HAVE ON 
JANUARY 1, 
1999? /IF THE 
BLOCKHOLDE
R DID NOT 
EXIST WRITE 
DOWN “0”./ 
% % % % % % % % % % 







ER HAVE ON 
JULY 1, 1994? 
/IF THE 
BLOCKHOLDE
R DID NOT 
EXIST WRITE 
DOWN “0”./ 
% % % % % % % % % % 
           
117. WHAT WAS 
THE 
BLOCKHOLDER 
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PERMITTED./ 
1. customer of your 
firm 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2. supplier of your 
firm 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3. creditor of your 
firm 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4. competitor of 
your firm 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5. intermediary 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6. nothing of the 
above 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
 
LET’S TALK ABOUT NEXT BLOCKHOLDER WHICH EXISTED ON 
JANUARY 1, 1999. IF THERE WAS NONE, LET’S TALK ABOUT ANY 
WHICH EXISTED ON JULY 1, 1994 BUT ONLY ABOUT THOSE ONES 
WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET TALKED ABOUT. /IF THE RESPONDENT 
SAYS THAT THERE WERE NONE, THEN GO TO Q. #118, SECTION 5. IF 
THERE WERE OTHER BLOCKHOLDERS, ASK QUESTIONS 113-117./ 
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5. Corporate Governance in a Joint Stock Company 
 
118. IS YOUR ENTERPRISE A JOINT-STOCK COMPANY OF ANY KIND 
AT THE PRESENT MOMENT? 
 
 Yes..........................1 
 No............................2 => go to Q. # 140 
 
119. DID YOUR ENTERPRISE HAVE PREFERRED SHARES ON 





120. DID YOUR ENTERPRISE HAVE PREFERRED SHARES ON 





INTERVIEWER! DECIDE ON THE DATES FOR THE NEXT QUESTION. IF 




QUESTION 119  QUESTION 120 
---------------------  --------------------- 
“YES”  “YES”, THEN ASK QUESTIONS ON BOTH 
    DATES /№№121–138./ 
 
“YES”  “NO”,  THEN ASK QUESTIONS ONLY ON 
    JANUARY 1, 1999 /№121-128,137./ 
 
“NO”  “YES”, THEN ASK QUESTIONS ONLY ON 
    JULY 1, 1994 /№129-136,138/ 
 
“NO”    “NO”,  THEN GO TO Q. # 139 
 
121-136. WE DO NOT INTEND TO ASK THE NAMES OF THE OWNERS 
OF YOUR PREFERRED SHARES. HOWEVER, WE WOULD LIKE TO 
RECEIVE INFORMATION ABOUT THE GENERAL CATEGORIES OF 
OWNERS OF PREFERRED SHARES THAT EXISTED AT YOUR 
ENTERPRISE AND % OF PREFERRED SHARES THAT THEY OWNED. 
 
WERE THE OWNERS 
OF PREFERRED 
SHARES OF YOUR 
ENTERPRISE ON... 
 ... January 1, 
1999 





121. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
129. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
     
FEDERAL STATE 
AUTHORITIES? 
122. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
130. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 




123. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
131. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
     
MANAGERS OF YOUR 
ENTERPRISE? 
124. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
132. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 




125. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
133. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
     




126. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
134. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
     




127. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
135. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 
     
FOREIGNERS? 128. Yes...1 => 
%?_______ 
No.....2 




137-138. % OF PREFERRED SHARES FROM THE TOTAL NUMBER OF 
ALL SHARES ON... 
  
JANUARY 1, 1999 JULY 1, 1994 
_____________________ _____________________ 
 
139. WHO KEEPS THE SHAREHOLDERS' REGISTRY? 
Department of the enterprise..............................1 
Outside company...............................................2 
There is no registry............................................3 
 
134 
140-141. DID THE STATE HAVE THE GOLDEN SHARE ON... 
 JANUARY 1, 1999    JULY 1, 1994 
 
Yes..............………….....1   Yes........……........……1 
No.............………….......2   No.......…...……....……2 
 
IF THE RESPONDENT DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT IS THE 
“GOLDEN SHARE”, EXPLAIN: THE GOLDEN SHARE BELONGS TO THE 
STATE AND GIVES IT THE POWER OF VETO ON SOME DECISIONS OF 
THE COMPANY. 
 
IF YOU GOT A POSITIVE ANSWER TO Q. #140 OR #141 FOR ANY 
DATE, ASK Q. #142. IF NOT, GO TO Q. #144 
 
142. DID THE STATE USE ITS VETO POWER? 
 
Yes...........................1 
No............................2 => go to Q. #144 
143. PLEASE, TELL US ABOUT CASES WHEN THE VETO POWER WAS 
USED. 
 








144-149. NOW WE WOULD LIKE TO ASK A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS 
ABOUT THE VOTING PRACTICES ON YOUR COMPANY 
SHAREHOLDERS’ OR PARTICIPANTS' MEETINGS. 
 
144. IS VOTING AT THE GENERAL SHAREHOLDERS' OR 
PARTICIPANTS' MEETINGS FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS ALWAYS DONE BY THE PRINCIPLE “1 SHAREHOLDER 






145. IF THE RESPONDENT'S ANSWER IS "OTHER" (CODE 3), THEN ASK 




146. IS VOTING ON THE GENERAL SHAREHOLDERS' OR 








147. IF THE RESPONDENT'S ANSWER IS "OTHER" (CODE 3), THEN ASK 




148. DOES THE COUNTING COMMISSION ALWAYS WORK ON THE 






149. IF THE RESPONDENT'S ANSWER IS "OTHER" (CODE 3), THEN ASK 





6. Social Relationships at the Enterprise 
6.1. Fringe benefits 
150-163. ADDITIONALLY TO CASH INCOMES WHICH OF THE 
FOLLOWING GOODS AND SERVICES WERE PROVIDED FOR FREE 
OR SUBSIDIZED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE COMPANY? 
ATTENTION: NOT INSTEAD OF CASH INCOMES BUT IN ADDITION 
TO CASH INCOMES! 
FOR FREE OR SUBSIDIZED AT THE 
EXPENSE OF THE ENTERPRISE... 
1990 1994 1998 
150. Land plots or cultivation services or 







    
151. Purchase of housing, covering costs of 








    
152. Construction of housing for employees 







    








    
154. Food not produced by enterprise or 







    
155. Other goods not produced by the 








    








    
157. Subsidizing or covering costs of housing 







    
158. Medical services (own policlinics) or 
covering costs of medical services 
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160. Professional education or covering costs 







    






    
162. Entertainment and cultural facilities or 







    
 









6.2. Wage Arrears 
164. HAS YOUR ENTERPRISE HAD WAGE ARREARS DURING THE 
PERIOD OF 1991 TO 1998? 
 
 Yes............................1 
 No.............................2 => go to Q. #168, section 6.3 
 
INTERVIEWER! QUESTIONS #165-167 FIRST ASK FOR 1998, THEN FOR 
1997, AND SO ON UP TO 1991. 
165. PLEASE, ESTIMATE THE VOLUME OF WAGE ARREARS IN 
MONTHLY WAGE FUNDS BY MONTHS AND THEN TAKE AN 
AVERAGE OVER THE COURSE OF THE YEAR. 
EXAMPLE OF TAKING AN AVERAGE FOR THE 1ST QUARTER: 
WAGE ARREARS FOR JANUARY – 3 MONTHLY WAGE FUNDS 
 FOR FEBRUARY – 2 MONTHLY FUNDS 
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 FOR MARCH – 1 MONTHLY FUND 
 THEN AN AVERAGE VOLUME OF WAGE ARREARS FOR THE 1ST 
QUARTER IS EQUAL TO 
(3+2+1)/3 MONTHS = 2 
 
THE CALCULATIONS FOR THE WHOLE YEAR ARE TO BE MADE 
ANALOGOUSLY 
 
166. ESTIMATE AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES WHO HAD 
WAGE ARREARS DURING THE YEAR. 
167. ESTIMATE PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES WHO WERE ALWAYS 

















165. The volume of wage 
arrears in monthly wage 
funds by months averaged 
over the course of the year 
 
166. Average percentage of 
employees who had wage 
arrears during the year 
 
167. Percentage of employees 
who were always paid on 
time during the year 
 
6.3. Strikes 
168. DID YOU HAVE ANY FORMS OF PROTEST BEHAVIOR OF 





No.............................2 =>   go to Q. #175, section 7 
 
169-174. PLEASE, TELL US THE TYPE OF PROTEST BEHAVIOR, YEAR 
AND MONTH WHEN IT HAPPENED, LENGTH OF ACTION, NUMBER 
OF PARTICIPANTS, AND THE REASONS FOR THE ACTION. 
 















174. reasons for 
action 
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7. Supplies, sales and payments 
7.1. Price controls 
175. ESTIMATE PERCENTAGE OF SALES SUBJECT TO PRICE 
CONTROLS (HERE WE ALSO INCLUDE SHARE OF OUTPUT WHICH 
HAS OR HAD PRICE OR PROFIT CEILINGS) 
 1990 1992 1994 1998 
Percentage of sales subject to 
price controls 
    
 
7.2. Suppliers 
176-179. PLEASE, ESTIMATE THE SHARE (IN %) OF SUPPLIES FROM 
THE “OLD” AND “NEW”, RUSSIAN AND NON-RUSSIAN SUPPLIERS 
BY YEARS. 
 
SUPPLIERS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS ARE CONSIDERED 
TO BE NON-RUSSIAN. 
 
"OLD" ARE THOSE WHO WERE SUPPLIERS FROM (AT LEAST) 1990 AND 
CONTINUED TO SUPPLY IN THE CORRESPONDING YEAR. “OLD” 
SUPPLIERS WHICH WERE RENAMED OR THOSE WHICH SPLIT-UP FROM 
YOUR “OLD” SUPPLIER ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED “NEW”. 
 
"NEW" ARE THOSE WHO WERE NOT SUPPLIERS IN 1990. 
INTERMEDIARIES ARE NOT COUNTED AS “NEW”. 
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 1990 1994 1998 
176. Old Russian suppliers    
177. New Russian suppliers    
178. Old non-Russian suppliers    
179. New non-Russian suppliers    
       Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
7.3. Payments for output of your firm 
180. DID YOUR FIRM USE NON-MONETARY FORMS OF PAYMENT WITH 
YOUR CUSTOMERS, LIKE MUTUAL CANCELLATION OF DEBTS, 
BARTER, VEKSELS, AND THE LIKE? 
Yes...........................1 
 No.............................2        =>   go to Q. # 187, section 7.4 
 
181-186. ESTIMATE PERCENTAGE OF YOUR SALES THAT WERE PAID 
FOR USING: 
 1994 1998 
181. Barter   
182. Clearing schemes   
183. Veksels   
184. Bank transfers   
185. Cash   
186. Other, describe____________________________   
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Total, % 100% 100% 
 
INTERVIEWER! CHECK WHETHER THE SUM IN TOTAL IS 100%. IF 
NOT, ASK WHY AND WRITE THE ANSWER BELOW 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
7.4. Payments for Material Resources Used in Production 
187. DID YOUR FIRM USE NON-MONETARY FORMS OF PAYMENT WITH 
YOUR SUPPLIERS, LIKE MUTUAL CANCELLATION OF DEBTS, 
BARTER, VEKSELS, AND THE LIKE? 
 
Yes...........................1 
No............................2 =>   go to Q. # 194 
 
188-193. ESTIMATE THE SHARE (IN %) OF MATERIAL RESOURCES 
PAID USING: 
 1994 1998 
188. Barter   
189. Clearing schemes   
190. Veksels   
191. Bank transfers   
192. Cash   
193. Other, explain________________________   
Total, % 100% 100% 
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INTERVIEWER! CHECK WHETHER THE SUM IN TOTAL IS 100%. IF 
NOT, ASK WHY AND WRITE THE ANSWER BELOW 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
194. IF YOU HAD AN OVERDUE LOAN FROM A BANK, DID THE BANK 





195. AT THE END OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING YEARS, WAS THE 




















At the end of 
each of the 
following years, 
was the main 
bank account 










































8.1. Percentage of old equipment 
196. WHAT IS THE SHARE (IN %) OF THE OLD EQUIPMENT ON YOUR 
ENTERPRISE, I.E. WHICH WAS RENEWED MORE THAN 4 YEARS 
AGO (HERE WE MEAN RENEWAL BY THE BRAND NEW 
EQUIPMENT)? 
 1990 1994 1998 
Share of equipment more than 4 years old 
(%)  
   
 
8.2. Innovations 
197-198. WAS YOUR COMPANY RECEIVING PATENTS ON NEW GOODS, 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESSES, EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS DURING 
1991-98? ITS NUMBER BY YEARS. 




































        
 
8.3. Research and Development 
199. PLEASE, ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES WHO WORKED 
IN R&D DEPARTMENTS OF YOUR FIRM, INCLUDING THOSE IN 
CONSTRUCTION BUREAUS AND OTHER WHO DESIGN NEW 
146 
PRODUCTS AND TECHNOLOGY. 
 
 1990 1994 1998 
Number of employees who 
worked in R&D departments of 
your firm 
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[TO BE ANSWERED BY PERSONNEL OFFICE] 
 
9. Employment 
9.1. Composition of labor force 
200-208. PLEASE, ESTIMATE THE COMPOSITION OF YOUR 
PERSONNEL-IN-THE-STAFF BY AGE, GENDER, AND EDUCATION 
AT THE END OF CORRESPONDING YEAR. 
 at the end of 1998 
200. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES  
  of which: 
Percent of employees (%): at the 
end of 
1998 
201. younger than 30 y.o.  
202. older than 50 y.o.  
203.        women  
204.                  university education  
205.                  “special” vocational (example 
“tekhnikum”) 
 
206.                  “professional technical” vocational 
(example “PTU”) 
 
207.                  secondary  
208.                  lower than secondary  
 
9.2. Professional education 
209. PLEASE, NAME PROFESSION OF PRODUCTION WORKERS OF 
THE MAIN ACTIVITY OF YOUR ENTERPRISE THAT YOU USUALLY 





  Profession 
210-211. ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF DAYS WHICH IS NECESSARY TO 
TRAIN THE AFOREMENTIONED WORKER, INCLUDING TIME OF 
FORMAL TRAINING AT ENTERPRISE AND TIME SPEND BY 
INSTRUCTORS TO TRAIN THE WORKER IF... 
210. WORKER DID NOT DO A SIMILAR WORK BEFORE. 
211. WORKER WAS EARLIER EMPLOYED IN THIS OCCUPATION AT 
SOME OTHER ENTERPRISE IN THIS INDUSTRY. 
The worker earlier... Number of days which is 
necessary to train the 
worker 
210. Did not do a similar work  




9.3. Hiring costs 
212. SUPPOSE ONE WORKER OF THIS TYPE QUITS THE FIRM, AND 
YOU MUST HIRE A REPLACEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOW 
MANY MAN-HOURS WOULD THE PERSONNEL OFFICE WORK TO 
ARRANGE ADVERTISEMENTS, INTERVIEW CANDIDATES, 
PROCESS PAPERWORK, ETC. TO HIRE THE REPLACEMENT 
(EXCLUDING THE TIME OF WAITING FOR THE WORKER TO SHOW 







9.4. Trade Unions 
213. ESTIMATE WHAT SHARE OF YOUR EMPLOYEES WERE MEMBERS 
OF ANY TRADE UNION AT THE END OF THE FOLLOWING YEARS: 
 1990 1994 1998 
Share of members (%)    
 
9.5. Computerization 
214. PLEASE ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF YOUR EMPLOYEES WHO 
MOST OF THEIR WORKING TIME USE COMPUTERS OR 
COMPUTERIZED EQUIPMENT (DO NOT COUNT CHPU). 
215. PLEASE ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF YOUR EMPLOYEES WHO 
ARE PROGRAMMING AND SERVICING COMPUTERS AND 
COMPUTERIZED EQUIPMENT (DO NOT COUNT ChPU). 
 1990 1994 1998 
214. Number of employees who use computers or 
computerized equipment 
   
215. Number of employees who are programming 
and servicing computers 
   
INTERVIEWER! COPY MONTH AND YEAR FROM POSITIONS 1 AND 





       
Region code  Sample point  No of interviewer  No of questionnaire 
 
Industrial Enterprises Survey - 99. Part 2. 
 
NAME OF THE COMPANY   
LAST, FIRST AND MIDDLE NAME OF THE INTERVIEWER:  
________________________________________________________ 
 






[TO BE ANSWERED BY PLANNING DEPARTMENT] 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO FILL OUT THESE SECTIONS: 
THESE SECTIONS ARE FILLED OUT USING FIRM'S YEARLY REPORTS 
ON EMPLOYMENT. THESE REPORTS MAY INCLUDE YEARLY, QUARTERLY, 
OR MONTHLY FORMS 1-T (OR PERHAPS 2-T) FOR YEARS 1995-1997, AND 
FORM P-4 FOR 1998. IF THERE ARE SIMILAR FORMS FOR EARLIER 
YEARS1990-1994, PLEASE USE THEM TO FILL IN THE TABLES. HOWEVER, 
ROW NUMBERS IN STATISTICAL FORMS MAY CHANGE FROM YEAR TO 
YEAR, SO IN EVERY CASE BEFORE PUTTING AN ANSWER IN A TABLE, 
PLEASE, CHECK WHETHER THE MEANING OF AN ENTRY IN A TABLE IS 
THE SAME AS THE ONE IN STATISTICAL FORM. IF YOU CANNOT FIND 
APPROPRIATE ROW IN STATISTICAL FORM, PLEASE, ASK RESPONDENT 
FOR A ROUGH ESTIMATE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF THE NUMBER 
OF FORMER EMPLOYEES AMONG ALL THOSE HIRED (Q. #232), YOU WILL 
HAVE TO ASK FOR A ROUGH ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF FORMER 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   










































































































































   
































































































































































[TO BE ANSWERED BY ACCOUNTING DEPARTMENT] 
 
10. General information about the enterprise 
 
INSTRUCTION: USE THE COMPANY’S CHARTER WHEN FILLING OUT THIS 
SECTION 
 








239. CODE OF THE ENTERPRISE BY OKPO: 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
240. CODE OF THE MINISTRY BY OKOGU (SOOGU):  
________________________ 
 










243. PHONE # (____) ___________ 
 
244. FAX # (____) ___________ 
 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   















   


































   







































   











   
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































275-281. PLEASE, PROVIDE THE AMOUNT OF INVESTMENT IN FINANCIAL 
ASSETS AT THE END OF 1994 AND 1998. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: USE THE ADDENDUM TO ACCOUNTING BALANCE, 
FORM 5 BY OKUD, CHAPTER 5; TOTAL AMOUNT IS A SUM OF LONG-TERM 
AND SHORT-TERM INVESTMENT IN A GIVEN YEAR (SUM OF COLUMNS 
4+6), IN THE ROWS MARKED WITH THE WORD "ESTIMATE", PLEASE, ASK 
FOR THE PERCENT ESTIMATES. 




275. Investment in equity in other firms 
       of which 
510   
276.   in firms with the same owner as 




277.   in banks Estimate, 
% 
  
278. Other bonds: 520   
279.   of which in GKO Estimate, 
% 
  
280. Loans 530   





282-283. TOTAL DEBT TO BANKS AND THE NUMBER OF BANKS TO 
WHICH THE DEBT IS OWED AT THE END OF THE 
CORRESPONDING YEAR. 
 
INSTRUCTION: PLEASE, USE THE ADDENDUM TO ACCOUNTING BALANCE, 
FORM 5 OKUD, THE NUMBERS OF ROWS ARE GIVEN IN THE TABLE. 
Measuring units (thou, 
mln) 




282. DEBT TO BANKS 110+130+140   
283. NUMBER OF BANKS ----------------------   
 
284-290. TOTAL OVERDUE PAYABLES AND RECEIVABLES AND THE 
SHARES (IN %) OF DIFFERENT PARTNERS. 
 
INSTRUCTION: OVERDUE PAYABLES AND RECEIVABLES IS A SUM OF 
SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM PAYABLES OR RECEIVABLES. PLEASE, USE 
THE ADDENDUM TO ACCOUNTING BALANCE, FORM 5 OKUD, THE 
NUMBERS OF ROWS TO ADD ARE GIVEN IN THE TABLE. PLEASE, ASK FOR 
ESTIMATES IN ROWS MARKED WITH THE WORD "ESTIMATE". 
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A. Receivables 





       OF WHICH: 
211+221   
285. STATE BUDGET Estimate, %   
286. OTHER CUSTOMERS Estimate, %   
[NOTE: ROWS 285 + 286 = 100%] 
B. Payables 





       OF WHICH : 
231+241   





289. TO ENTERPRISES Estimate, 
% 
  
290. TO BANKS Estimate, 
% 
  
[NOTE: ROWS 288 + 289 + 290 MAY BE LESS THAN 100%] 
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12.6. Some financial indicators 
PLEASE ESTIMATE THE FOLLOWING FINANCIAL INDICATORS OF THE 
ENTERPRISE BY YEARS. 
 
INSTRUCTION: IN 294 AND 295, PLEASE, USE DATA FROM ACCOUNTING 
BALANCE, FORM 3 OKUD, THE ROW NUMBERS ARE GIVEN IN THE TABLE. 
IF THERE ARE ANALOGOUS FORMS FOR EARLIER YEARS, PLEASE, USE 
THEM TO FILL IN THE TABLE. 




291. LOANS ON PREFERENTIAL TERMS 
                         OF WHICH: ---------- 
  
                         292. FOR INVESTMENT Estimate, 
% 
  
                         293. FOR CONVERSION Estimate, 
% 
  
294. TARGETED FINANCING FROM 
STATE BUDGET 
090   
295. TARGETED FINANCING FROM 
BRANCH AND INTER-BRANCH OFF-
BUDGET FUNDS 
100   
 
INSTRUCTION: IN 298, PLEASE, USE THE DATA FROM ACCOUNTING 
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BALANCE, FORM 4 OKUD, THE ROW NUMBERS ARE GIVEN IN THE TABLE. 
IF THERE ARE ANALOGOUS FORMS FOR EARLIER YEARS, PLEASE, USE 
THEM TO FILL IN THE TABLE. 




296. AMOUNT OF TAX BREAKS ______   
297. TOTAL AMOUNT OF TAXES AND 
PAYMENTS DUE TO BUDGET (NOT 
ACCOUNTING FOR TAX BREAKS) 
______   
         298. FROM WHICH: TOTAL 
AMOUNT OF TAXES AND 






         299. FROM WHICH: TOTAL 
AMOUNT OF TAXES AND 
PAYMENTS ACTUALLY PAID 
TO BUDGET USING BANK 
TRANSFERS OR IN CASH 
______   
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INSTRUCTION: IN 300, PLEASE, USE THE DATA FROM ACCOUNTING 
BALANCE, FORM 1 OKUD, THE ROW NUMBERS ARE GIVEN IN THE TABLE. 
IF THERE ARE ANALOGOUS FORMS FOR EARLIER YEARS, PLEASE, USE 
THEM TO FILL IN THE TABLE. 




300. ARREARS ON PAYMENTS TO 
BUDGET 





301. AMOUNT OF ARREARS ON 
PAYMENTS TO BUDGET THAT WERE 
WRITTEN OFF 
______   
INTERVIEWER! WRITE THE DATE OF COMPLETION OF THE 
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